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ABSTRACT
This study focuses on the role of political elites in addressing the problem of why a
durable peace has eluded Israeli Palestine.
A theoretical background study was made on the articulation of identity within a
civilization. This established identity formation as a political process. To see how the
manipulation of the structure within which identity formation processes take place, six
critical indicators were identified. These are: Manufacturing conditions of
underdevelopment; Un-integrated social and political systems, and distributive injustice;
Fostering cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism; Placing issues under
the 'sign of security'; The production of insecurity through the manipulation of identity
formation processes; and Monopolising the conflict resolution process.
Political elite creation and perpetuation of structures for conflict shows an inherent
inability to bring about a lasting peace in a protracted social conflict for conflict has
become the source, rather than the outcome of policy formation. As a result this thesis
calls for a more inclusive approach to conflict resolution, one that goes beyond the
processes of arbitration, mediation, negotiation and facilitation, to include conciliation at
grass roots level between civilizations, sincerely exploring the underlying emotional
legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust.
ill
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OPSOMMING
Hierdie studie fokus op die rol gespeel deur politieke elites 10 die voortslepende
vraagstuk rondom vrede in IsraelIPalestina.
'n Teoretiese agtergrondstudie is onderneem om die uitdrukking van 'n samelewings-
oftewel volksidentiteit te ondersoek. Die studie het laat blyk dat identiteitsformulering 'n
politieke proses is. Om waar te neem hoe die manipulasie van die struktuur waarbinne
identiteitsformulering plaasvind, is ses kritiese indikators geïdentifiseer, te wete: die
skepping van toestande vir onderontwikkeling; ongeïntegreerde sosiale en politieke
sisteme en ongelyke verdeling van welvaart; doelbewuste voortsetting van etniese
verskiJle, stereotipering en politieke simbolisme; plasing van kwessies onder die vaandel
van "sekuriteit"; die produksie van "onsekerheid" deur die manipulasie van
identiteitsformulering prosesse; en die manipulasie van konflik resolusie prosedures.
Skepping en doelbewuste voortsetting van strukture vir konflik deur politieke elites dui
op 'n onvermoë om langdurige vrede in 'n 'uitgerekte sosiale konflik' te bewerkstellig.
Konflik het die oorsprong, eerder as die uitkoms van beleid geword. As gevolg van
hierdie feite doen die tesis 'n beroep dat konflik resolusie as dissipline 'n meer
inklusiewe benadering volg. Die resolusie prosesse van mediasie, arbitrasie, fasilitering
en onderhandeling is opsigself nie genoeg nie en behoort vergesel te word deur die proses
van konsiliasie op grondvlak tussen samelewings. Hierdie proses moet deel vorm van 'n
opregtheid om mense se vrese, haat, seer en wantroue met ootmoed aan te hoor.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The chapter will begin by contextual ising the study. This will be followed by an
explanation of how the preliminary reading of the literature led me to a refinement and
focusing of my initial ideas. Next is a statement of the overall goals of the study as they
crystallized during the preliminary reading. This brings us to a rough indication of the
design and mode of reasoning fol1owed in addressing the research problem.
1.1: DEVELOPING THE IDEA FOR THE THESIS AND
MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY
The study ofInternational Relations is the study of how authority and/or power is used to
govern transborder interactions/ relations between actors and how this contributes to the
establishment! maintenance/ transformation of order in a global system. As a student of
International Relations, conflict and the processes involved in its resolution provide the
scholar with a unique opportunity to view the inner workings of relations between actors
in the global system. The Middle East conflict shows up anomalies in conventional
approaches to define conflict and processes used in its resolution. The researcher is
presented with a case of a peace process which reached dramatic heights, only to return to
a stalemate and violence. Many of the theoretical contributions encountered contribute to
the theoretical debate around conflict without ever questioning the structure within which
conflict takes place. The dynamic nature of this conflict led me to believe that there is
indeed scope and opportunity to add to the theoretical debate and influence opinion
within which policy is made by taking a step back and focusing on structure.
The main reasons that led me to decide on this topic can be divided into three categories:
theoretical, empirical and practical. Theory cannot be untied from practice, but has to
take on its rightful purpose as critique that reveals true conditions. Not only does it help
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2people to see the way to a better world, but it also creates and maintains the climate of
opinion within which policy is made. For the critical social scientist, contributions to the
scientific community are not enough; he or she can become the true organic intellectual
and help transform the social order by supplying people with the information needed to
do so.
The second reason that led me to decide on this topic is empirical in nature. Do we really
know so little about the causes of violence and terrorism that we have to blame it on the
'violent nature of man' or the 'machinations of a madman'? I think not. Recurring
patterns are empirically observable through the course of history. Social reality always
changes and this change is rooted in the tensions, conflicts or contradictions of social
relations, meanings, processes, structures or institutions. By focusing on intractable or
protracted conflicts such as the Middle East, recurring patterns can be tracked over time.
The final reason for choosing this topic is practical in nature. The Middle-East conflict
resolution process is an ongoing one. It is therefore still possible to influence the course
of events. In the words of Noam Chomsky: "Intellectuals ... are in a position to expose
lies of governments, to analyse actions in terms of their causes and motives and often
hidden intentions .... As for those who stood by in silence .... on what page of history do
we find our proper place?" (Vasquez, 1990:59) The critical social scientist can still
unmask ideology and the lies of governments; herein lays hislher vocation.
1.2: DERIVING THE RESEARCH TOPIC FROM THE
PRELIMINARY READING
Hermann & Newman in their article "A Path Strewn with Thorns: Along the Difficult
Road of Israeli-Palestinian Peace Making" (Darby & MacGinty, 2000:107) maintained
that in order to understand why the Middle-East peace process had taken such a backward
turn, it was necessary to deal with the deeper roots of the conflict in general, and in
particular the way in which each side perceived the intentions and deeply rooted beliefs
of the other side. They made the distinction of the perceptions of the public at large, as
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3opposed to those of political elites and negotiators who were responsible for the
management of the peace process. Central to their argument was the fact that for a legal
peace treaty to be translated into a reality of mutual accommodation, the nation's leaders
and political elites who were responsible for promoting such a political reorientation, had
to ensure that it attained 'cognitive legitimacy' at the grass roots level. Regarding their
contribution as problem solving theory, its value lies firstly in their distinction between
political elites and the public at large as role-players in the conflict resolution process,
secondly in their focus on the deeper roots of the conflict seen in the beliefs and attitudes
of the opposing sides, and finally, the centrality of 'cognitive legitimacy' as measured in
opinion polls.
Their focus on actions and beliefs however, failed to address the structure of the social
reality within which the conflict resolution process took place. In trying to present their
work as objective as possible, they fell into the trap of naturalizing the social reality
(replete with political symbolism), thereby exhibiting a conservative bias towards it. For
example: "Technical solutions to conflict resolution are simply not sufficient if they are
unable to be translated into genuine resolution of the conflict which includes the
changing of attitudes as part of a long term culture of change." (Hermann & Newman,
2000: 109) This central theorem is made to iron out problems and smooth the functioning
of the whole (or structure). It focuses on action without questioning the fact whether it is
indeed desirable for political elites to manipulate attitudes. To put it differently, it
focuses on process and action without taking into account the structure or arena within
which action takes place. Further theoretical contributions fall into the same trap. (Albin,
2000; Heraclides, 1989; Peretz, 1990) The preliminary reading of the literature led me to
ask the question of how structure influences the researcher and serves as a framework in
which conceptualisation of the conflict, its resolution, and its processes takes place. Are
researchers not perhaps blinded by their framework of thinking, which might serve to be
part of the problem?
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41.3: IDENTIFYING AND ARTICULATING TIlE RESEARCH
PROBLEM
The initial aim of my research proposal was to explore societal feelings of insecurity and
its relation to conflict resolution in IsraellPalestine. However, as the process of deriving
a research topic from the preliminary readings unfolded, it soon became apparent that
societal feelings of insecurity are not a natural state of being. Civilizations as media
through which people come to organise themselves materially and mentally to cope with
their material context and imagine a collective future, by its very nature, aim to provide a
secure sense of belonging. The continual process of identity formation is inherently
relational in that it constitutes conceptions of the self and of others based on collective
knowledge about expectations and intersubjective meanings. Meanings, in terms of
which actions are organised, arise out of interaction. Expectations and intersubjective
meanings are then the result of interaction. Societal feelings of insecurity are thus the
result of tensions, conflicts and contradictions of identity formation processes. By
focusing on these tensions, conflicts and contradictions in Israel, it became apparent that
the articuJation of identity could be established as a political process. The aim of this
thesis is to see if this is in fact so.
The problem statement of this thesis asks the following questions: "Why has durable
peace eluded Israel/Palestine?" More specifically, the research question deaJs with the
role of political elites in the collapse of the peace initiatives seen during the 1990's and
beyond. The research question deals specifically with the role of political elites in this
process and asks the question: "What has the role of political elites been in preventing
cognitive legitimacy of the peace process?" This alJows me to explore the structure
(including the rules, procedures, roles, hierarchy, norms and regulations) within which
action takes place. Structure encompasses the framework within which research,
discourses on security, production of insecurity, identity formation processes, distributive
injustice, conflict and, conflict resolution processes takes place.
The key research proposition reads as follow: "Political elites have helped create and
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5perpetuate a structure for conflict." In order to show the validity of this proposition, it
is not any single event that is of interest, but rather the flow and the sequence of events,
or the historical context of any single event. Attention will be given to the claim that
political elites are unable to bring about lasting peace within a protracted social conflict
for they rely on processes that help to manage the conflict and 'normalise' the situation
alone, instead of fostering additional mechanisms aimed at conciliation between the
opposing collectivities. Peace treaties would then be based on economic and political
enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations, without being accompanied by
sincere exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust;
and without addressing the deep rooted causes of the conflict. This argument does not
mean to say that political elites do not negotiate in good will or good faith, but that they
alone cannot bring about a lasting peace.
The research objective would be to show whether political elites have helped create and
perpetuate a structure for conflict by identifying critical indicators that shed light on the
actions of political elites. Six of these have initially been identified:
1. Manufacturing conditions of underdevelopment;
2. Un-integrated social and political systems, and distributive injustice;
3. Fostering cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism;
4. Placing issues under the 'sign of security';
5. The production of insecurity through the manipulation of identity formation
processes;
6. Monopolising the conflict resolution process.
If these critical indicators are validated, it will enable us to see that in a protracted social
conflict, such as is the case in the Middle East, conflict has become a source, rather than
the outcome of policy. A validated central proposition would underline the need for a
more inclusive approach to conflict resolution, one involving conciliation at grass roots
level between civilizations.
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61.4: GENERAL INDICATION OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND
METHODOLOGY
This thesis is a descriptive historical study, allowing the researcher to reconstruct the past
by taking the chronology of events into account. A critical, narrative analysis will be
used to illuminate the historically informed structure of social reality. The narrative
analysis will try to reconstruct a particular configuration of forces applying pressures and
constraints to civilization. Use will be made of retroductive reasoning- using inferences
from observations or data in order to construct or infer an explanation of such
observations. Historical data will be used to illustrate and test the validity of the central
proposition. The interaction of data and theory means that a researcher goes beyond the
surface examination of the evidence to develop new concepts by critically evaluating the
evidence based on theory. The main task when conducting a comparative historical study
lies not in revealing new data about particular aspects of large time periods, but rather in
establishing the interest and prima facie validity of an overall argument about causal
regularities across various historical events. Central to this task is the identification of
critical indicators and supporting evidence for themes and explanations. Data will mostly
be gathered from three sources:
• pnmary sources- newspapers, declarations, accords, speeches and official
government websites;
• secondary sources- bibliographic work including scholarly articles, surveys,
historical records and textbooks;
• running records such as the peace index, crisis magnitude index, international
crisis behaviour and government records.
The Research Design focuses on the testing of the central proposition: "Political elites
have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict." The structure of conflict
serves as dependent or effect variable for it is purported to be the outcome of different
types of action taken by political elites. Actions taken or not taken by political elites
serve as the independent variable. The six 'critical indicators' as set out in the research
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7objectives are necessary for inferring a specific causal relationship between the
dependent and independent variables. Indicators confirm a theoretical inference and
occur when many details suggest a clear interpretation. These critical indicators will be
supported by 'supporting evidence' that builds the overall background or context.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
8CHAPTER2
2.1: DEMARCATING THE LITERATURE COVERED
As pointed out, the initial development of the idea for this thesis stemmed from the
fruitful collaboration of Hermann & Newman (2001: 107). From this followed an
elaborate literature study to derive a topic and problem statement. The literature was also
studied to find out what has previously been said about the topic. This process took the
shape of interrelated steps:
STEP 1
Literature was sought to provide a satisfactory methodological placing of the role of
theory and practice. Theory is revealed as always for someone and for some purpose,
thereby exposing the power relation of theory do the dominant power matrix. This does
not imply a lapse into a relativist position where anything goes, the need for a
methodological approach to theory construction remains important. However,
recognition should be given to the fact that theory is biased. Making this fact explicit
allows the reader to avoid being constrained by dogma. Writers consulted include Nel,
(1999); Neuman, (2000); Waltz, (1979); Cox, (1981); Weides et al, (1999); Azar &
Burton, (1986).
STEP2
This step involved finding more literature on the process of Contlict Resolution in
International Relations. Special emphasis was placed on authors who have been involved
in actual problem solving and resolution workshops such as Burton (1990), Kriesberg
(1973), Mitchell (1981), Doob (1990) and Miall, Woodhouse & Ramsbotham (1999).
The aim was to gather a plethora of concepts and evaluate different approaches to conflict
resolution.
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9STEP3
The third step sought to expand the traditional concepts such as 'people at large', nation
and ethnic group into 'civilizations'. The compatibility of the concept 'civilizations' with
other concepts such as collective security, collective peace and bottom-up processes led
to the next step.
STEP4
The final step sought to unite problem solving theories of conflict resolution with critical
social science. Conflict needed to be studied over time, relating it to man's processes of
identity formation in social reality. Here, Azar's (1986) model of 'protracted social
conflicts' was developed with the help of Agnew (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson, 1989)
to suit the arguments used in this thesis.
2.2: PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS DEFINED
Any process of concept formation in comparative-historical study which is based on the
way society presents itself will be inadequate, misleading and ideological. Only after
interaction with the evidence gathered could we formulate new concepts to re-examine
the evidence.
CIVILIZATION
The first concept is 'civilization'. For Cox (1996(b):2), the material, technological,
economically organized and class structured entity called civilization was unified in the
realm of consciousness by religion. Religion enabled people encompassed within
civilization to develop a shared consciousness and symbols through which they could
communicate meaningfully. Myth, re1igion and language were coterminous until
language became secularised and rationalized. The material world provided a common
ground for experience, religion a common realm for thought. Religion should here be
understood in the wider sense as to include superstition, evil and a general belief structure
as enacted in ritual. Civilization then is defined by Cox as a fit between material
conditions and intersubjective meanings.
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A further distinction is made between culture and civilization, this is the distinction
between the synchronic and the diachronic. Culture is seen as the synchronic moment
concerned with how the manifold behavioural patterns in a social system interact in
maintaining the whole. Civilization is the diachronic dimension of culture. Ttsconcern is
with origin, encounters and transformations of civilizations. The focus is on development
and responses to internal and external challenges, as opposed to stability and equilibrium.
Civilizations has for Cox (1996:3) become the media through which people have come to
organize themselves materially and mentally to cope with their material context and
imagine a collective future. Civilizations as realms of intersubjectivity are not
irrevocably territorially based, it is rather a community of thought so that two or more
civilizations may co-exist within a geographical confine, even within a single individual.
For the purpose of this thesis, Cox's description of civilization holds a threefold
importance. Firstly, the concept embraces all the factors of man's identity formation
processes in his social world, i.e. material conditions and intersubjective meanings of
ideas, norms, values and institutions. This allows for an avoidance of reductionism to
any given attribute. Secondly, its shifting boundaries and overlapping allows it to be
flexible enough to manoeuvre within historical structural confines as to embrace or
discard ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, technological and class discrepancies that
occur when referring to a 'people at large'. Finally, the introduction of the diachronic or
temporal aspect allows for a tracking of societal change over time, thus following the
evolution of collective existence.
SECURITY
The second concept is security. There is no general agreement on a definition for this
concept but Buzan (1991: 17) lists some definitions given by others:
• Lawrence Martin: Security is the assurance of future well being.
• John E. Mroz: Security is the relative freedom from harmful threats.
• Arnold Wolfers: Security, in any objective sense measures the absence of threats
to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will
be attacked.
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Buzan refrains from venturing a defmition but describes security as the ability of states
and societies to maintain their individual identity and their functional integrity. "Tn
seeking security, state and society are sometimes in harmony with each other, sometimes
opposed .... Security is primarily about the fate of human collectives, and only secondary
about the personal security of individual human beings.... In the contemporary
international system, the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial state ... but
since nations and states do not fit neatly together in many places, non state collectives,
particularly nations are also important units of analysis" (1991:19). Buzan's description
is useful in that it separates the state and society and argues that their security interests
can sometimes be in disharmony. State sanctioned violence can and often is used against
those it is supposed to protect.
Miall (Booth, 1991:309) points out the emergence of "new thinking" which posits
security as a broader concept, thereby separating state security from "citizen's security."
This type of security includes physical and economic well being, civil and political
liberties, a sustainable environment and social justice. His argument correspondingly
includes the enlargement of threats such as unjust and unequal relationships between rich
and poor countries, poverty and starvation, environmental threats etc. Tt calls for an
awareness of what is being defended, thereby shifting conventional security discourses to
a systemic level. This implies a refocusing of what is to be secured- collective society,
and how it is to be secured- social justice and poverty alleviation.
Security for our purposes can now be defined as the ability of civilizations to maintain
and contribute to their individual identity and functional integrity, in relative freedom.
Collective security then, concerns the fate of specified human collectives. The collective
forms the main focus of analysis in ascertaining security needs and participation. The
sovereign territorial state, whose interests might oppose that of the collective, is regarded
as separate to the collective.
PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICTS
The third concept is protracted social conflicts. This is a type of ongoing, seemingly
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irresolvable conflict with certain key characteristics that are deep-rooted and provide an
infrastructure for seemingly intractable conflict (Azar, 1986:28). This concept will be
discussed in greater detail below (Chapter 2.3.4).
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The next concept is conflict resolution. Miall, Ramsbotham & Woodhouse (1999:21)
define conflict resolution as the addressing of deep-rooted sources of conflict. This
implies that behaviour is no longer violent, attitudes no longer hostile and the structure of
the conflict has changed. Although the state remains an important actor in the conflict
resolution process, other actors play an equally important role in its implementation.
Political elites play the main roles in four of the five processes of conflict resolution:
arbitration, mediation, negotiation and facilitation. These four processes all have to do
with the management of the conflict resolution process. The fifth process is conciliation.
For the purposes of this thesis conciliation can be defined as bottom-up process of
continued dialogue and interaction on grass roots level by the two main opposing
civilizations. Conflict resolution at civilizational level is a process separate, yet in
tandem with conflict resolution between political elites, a bottom-up conciliatory process
of continued dialogue and interaction on grass roots level. This does not mean that there
is no conciliation, confidence building or showing of good will between political elites, it
does however exclude conciliation as defined above, as an active ingredient found in the
peace processes engaged in by political elites.
POLITICAL ELITES
This concept includes the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Stepan
defines the state within a Weberian perspective as follow: "The state must be considered
as more than the' government'. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and
coercive systems that attempt not only to structure relations between civil society and
public authority in a polity, but also to structure many crucial relationships within civil
society as well" (quoted in Skocpol, 1985:7). Political elites include powerful individuals
connected to the state/authority, granting their voice prima facie validity. It is these
leaders who make policy statements, important decisions that affect collectivities,
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speeches and deliver commentary on events. Such leaders would also include individuals
connected to the terrorist organisations who actively influence the direction of
negotiations. An example would be members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad issuing
statements.
2.3: DISCUSSION OF THE LITERATURE READ
The literature covered will now be discussed, based on the steps outlined m the
demarcation of the literature covered above.
- 2.3.1
- 2.3.2
- 2.3.3
- 2.3.4
Methodological Placing
Towards a clearer understanding of conflict resolution
Expanding collectivity
An underlying model: Protracted social conflicts
2.3.1: METHODOLOGICAL PLACING
Nel (1999:50) defines theory as a mental picture of how a specific segment of reality
hangs together or are connected. Neuman (2000:40) is more cautious with his approach
to reality and thus defines theory as a system of interconnected abstractions or ideas that
condenses and organizes 'knowledge' about the social world. Waltz (1979:6) states that
"Laws are facts of observation, theories are speculative processes introduced to explain
them." Paracelsus would have it that speculation is when man speculates and imagines
within himself and thereby his imagination is united with heaven, and heaven operates so
within him that more is discovered than would seem possible by merely human methods.
This would equate to Newton's 'Eureka' or Rosenau's "exhilaration or exquisiteness to
be enjoyed in the theoretical enterprise that virtually defies description" (free translation,
1993:34).
All three the above definitions of Nel, Waltz and Neuman are in accord that theory
provides the researcher with a predisposition or a way of thinking. Nel explicitly and
Waltz by implication points out that theory is a way of thinking about reality. Neuman
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would rather have it that theory is a take on 'knowledge', gleaned from reality, therefore
subjectivity is implied. It is this very debate between objective observance of reality and
subjective gleaning of knowledge, taken from reality, that has occupied a large body of
rhetoric in the social sciences.
Scientific theory frames how we look and think about a topic. It contains a set of
assumptions or a starting point, then tries to explain what the social world is like and why
it changes. It offers a system of concepts or ideas, looks at relationships amongst
concepts and seeks the causes that provides an interconnected system of ideas. Simply
put, without it, researchers would find themselves adrift in a sea of knowledge.
Banks (Azar & Burton, 1986:6) provides us with a modem agreement between theory
and practice. Both the positions of 'practice dominates theory' (the positivist! objectivist
as archivist) and 'theory dominates practice' (the idealist! subjectivist as participant)
should be treated as ideologies. Both these positions are extreme and it is necessary to
take a compromise position. We cannot be wholehearted positivists for there are well
known problems with that position (Vasquez, 1990:108). On the other hand we cannot be
wholehearted subjectivists either because then we are in danger of treating people's ideas
as more important than actual conditions and focus on localized, micro-level, short term
settings while ignoring the broader, long-term context. For Banks, this fact sets the
context for an activist approach to work in conflict resolution:
"There is indeed an international relations system out there, and its institutions and
organizations are real enough. But the real world is also made up of habits and practices
and theories of how it all works. The theories are, to some degree self-perpetuating and
self-fulfilling. They help to create the reality that we have to deal with. We do need to
recognize that the existing system is shaped and conditioned by ideas. As writers and
teachers, we may not be responsible for the making of policy, but we are most certainly
responsible for creating and maintaining the climate of opinion within which policy is
made" (Azar & Burton, 1986;8).
The implication of looking at the theory/ reality relationship is the realization that the real
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world is not unchangeable. If it was made by people, it can in principle be remade by
people.
2.3.2: TOWARDS A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
Conflict between tribes and nations has its roots at the dawn of time and has remained a
concern of societies and civilizations ever since. The creation of conflict resolution as an
academic discipline in Western civilization had its origins only in the 1950's, and grew
out of different practices.
Abu-Nimer (1996:35) identifies five such movements:
The industrial labour management work of Shepard & Mouton which emerged from
organizational relations in the 1960's (Abu-Nimer, 1996); The problem solving
workshops and mediation which was introduced into International Relations by Burton
(1969), Kelman (1976), Doob (1971), and Mitchell (1981); Religious figures redirecting
their work in peace related endeavours to an emphasis on "peace making" [Scimecca
(1987) Abu- Nimer, 1996]; Lawyers and the court system in mainly the U.S.A. were
criticized by the genera1 public which resulted in what is known today as alternative
dispute resolution, and; The interpersonal and family dispute practices derived from
human relations practices as led by Walton, (1971); Haynes, (1981); Coogler; (1978).
Out of these approaches several intervention approaches have been developed and
applied at different levels of conflict. The main processes of conflict resolution being
facilitation, negotiation, arbitration, mediation and conciliation.
This study also concentrates on the problem solving workshops as mentioned by Abu-
Nimer above. These workshops are examples of how academics and/or political elites
have gone about trying to resolve conflicts in the past.
De Reuck (Burton, 1990:183) argued that the essence of problem solving procedure
involves a meeting with representatives from opposing parties in the presence of a small
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panel of disinterested, professional and qualified social scientists. This should be done in
order to analyse and possibly resolve conflicts in complete confidentiality. Parties should
be enabled by the panel to negotiate through collaboration, in order to reach solutions of
their joint predicament, by discovering accommodations affording net advantages to all
concerned. The joint predicament is a problem to be solved. With a few minor
exceptions, this captures the essence of all the different problem solving workshops.
Workshops covered include:
• Burton's "Controlled Communication Workshops" (Sandole & Sandole-Staroste,
1987 :25r,Burton, 1990);
• Doob's "Fermeda Workshop" (Azar, 1990:24);
• Azar's "Problem Solving Forums" at the University of Maryland (Azar, 1990:29);
• Groom's "George Mason University Project" (Sandole & Sandole-Staroste,
1987:275).
Apart from certain techniques developed in the management of problem solving
workshops, (i.e. confidentiality, joint collaboration etc.), important aspects to emerge
from the workshops can be listed as follows. Burton noted the importance of a
conceptualisation change through perception changes in parties. Azar added to this
conducive environments and the exploration of shared needs and values such as security,
identity, equality, participation and control, freedoms etc. Groom noted the problem of
vantage points being determined by hierarchies. Finally, Doob pointed out the 're-entry'
problem in trying to influence constituencies back home. This is echoed by Fisher and
Wedge (Sandole & Sandole-Staroste, 1987: 203 & 208 respectively). Fisher calls this the
multi-party problem and articulates it along the same lines as Putnam in "Diplomacy and
Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games" (1988: 431)
Three other contributions to the field of Conflict Resolution outside the problem solving
workshops also have to be mentioned. Firstly, Kelman (Burton, 1990:200) introduces
social-psychological analysis and suggests a broader vision of goals to which negotiation
should be directed. Conflict is seen as a phenomenon occurring between societies and
not necessarily states. Negotiations then have to go beyond the achievement of political
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agreement to a resolution of the conflict, a process conducive to structural and attitudinal
change and eventually to reconciliation between parties, thus transforming the
relationship. This process requires measures capable of de-escalatory dynamics.
Kelman's importance lies in his vision of an enlargement of the scope of conflict
resolution to incorporate societies, both as agents in conflict and in its resolution.
The second contribution is from Van der Merwe et al. (Burton, 1990:216) He states that
in a situation where gross injustices are built into the major social structures, such as in
South Africa pre 1990's, conflict cannot be accommodated constructively and social
justice and peace cannot be achieved without fundamental structural change. Tt is this
structural change that is of central concern to the thesis.
The third contribution comes from Kriesberg (Kriesberg, Northrup & Thorson,
1989:109). He argues that every particular conflict is interlocked with many others and
that whichever we decide to focus on will be found to be embedded in others over time
and space. Many different parties are involved in each fight and the conflict may be
intractable for some but not for others. Conflict is regarded as more or less intractable
with resolution involving the transformation of intractability. The idea of the
interconnectedness of conflicts can be extended in all directions, not just to other
conflicts but to the configuration of forces that interact within each structure.
Intractability within a particular conflict such as the Middle East can differ depending on
position in time and space, implying that actors are dynamic and diverse.
2.3.3: EXPANDING COLLECTIVITY
In defining civilizations as a fit between material conditions of existence and
intersubjective meanings, we infuse the concept with quite a large amount of flexibility
indeed. As argued above, it is a community of thought so that two or more civilizations
may co-exist within a particular geographical confine, even within a single individual.
The introduction of the term civilization for Cox (1996: 2) is seen as synonymous with
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culture, the synchronic aspect of civilization. The term culture has a large number of
connotations attached to it, especially as it regards nation and the nation-state. A
"collective" however, is a group of people who share some pattern of normative
behaviour and who form part of a larger population interacting within a common social
system. For the purposes of this thesis, collective is used to denote the synchronic
moment of civilization. A 'collective' is used as opposed to ethnic, cultural or national
groupings, these concepts restricting an individual's classification to the colour of his
skin or any other kind of cultural trait. Collective is any and all of these classifications as
governed by the identity formation processes within a certain moment in history and as
specified by the researcher or social group.
Intersubjective meanings within a collective in the form of traditions, are never static and
constantly being reinterpreted or even re-invented by succeeding generations
(Hobsbawo & Ranger as quoted by Agnew, 1989:42). The symbols people use to
identify themselves are objects, acts, events, relationships and linguistic forms that stand
ambiguously, for a multiplicity of meanings, evoke emotions and impel men to action.
Cohen argues that they usually occur in stylised patterns of activities such as ritual,
ceremonies, gift exchange, prescribed patterns of joking, taking an oath, eating and
drinking together, acts of etiquette and various other cultural traits that constitute the
'style of life' of a group (Agnew, 1989:42). There is a danger in accepting long run
claims of continuity at face value, the meanings and symbols central to a particular
collective identity may well have been fundamentally transformed. As intersubjective
meanings within a col1ective are reinterpreted and new ones invented, one can speak of
civilizations evolving.
2.3.4: AN UNDERLYING MODEL - PROTRACTED SOCIAL
CONFLICTS
A critical approach notes that social change and conflict are not always apparent or
observable. The social world is full of illusion, myth and distortion. Initial observations
of the world are only partial and often misleading because the human senses are limited
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.and so is our knowledge. The appearances in surface reality do not have to be based on
conscious deception. The immediately perceived characteristics of objects, events or
social relations rarely reveal everything. (Neuman, 2000:77)
Social reality has multiple layers and evolves over time. Behind the immediately
observable surface reality lie deep structures or unobservable mechanisms. Constant
change is rooted in tensions, conflict and contradictions of social relations and
institutions. By researching tension, conflict and contradictions over time, it is possible
to observe these deep structures and unobservable mechanisms that influence behaviour.
As Azar points out: "War and poverty, which are dramatically obvious to the observer
and the main cause of human physical suffering are but symptoms of underlying
structural conditions. The notion of protracted social conflicts provide a deeper insight
into the issues of conflict-motivations; authority roles; political and social structures;
behaviour patterns, needs and interests; and other aspects. It draws our attention away
from the obvious and superficial towards the underlying conditions that create conflict
situations. It directs our attention finally, to the means of resolution." (1999: 15). The
utility of protracted social conflict in the overall study of conflict is that it places
'conflict-process' as central in the tension between states or other types of actors such as
collectivities at sub-state level. As Starr argues (1999:5): "In protracted conflict and rival
analysis, it is not any single event that is of interest, but rather the flow of events, the
sequence of events, or the historical context of a single event."
By establishing the Middle-East as a case of 'Protracted Social Conflict', we are able to:
1) track the conflict in its proper historical context, 2) analyse the conflict in a way that
cuts across levels of analysis to incorporate other actors, and 3) see how conflict itself
could become the source, rather than the outcome of policy. This thesis does not restrict
itself to pure structural reasons for behaviour but nonetheless find underlying structural
conditions useful in tracking conflict and specifically, elite actions in that conflict over
time.
Azar (1986:28) puts forward ten propositions on protracted social conflicts (PSC's) that
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can be summarized as follow:
t. PSC's have endearing features such as economic and technological
underdevelopment, unintegrated social and political systems and distributive
injustice. These features provide an infrastructure for intractable conflict.
2. The re-emergence of conflict in the same situation, a particular characteristic of
PSC's, suggest to anyone monitoring events over a long period of time, that the
real source of conflict - as distinct from features - are deep-rooted in the
ontological being of those concerned. The source ofPSC's are the denial of those
elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose
pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social
recognition of identity and effective participation.
3. Ethnic and communal cleavages and political structures associated with them are
conspicuous. (It is the denial of human needs, of which ethnic identity is merely
one, that emerges as the source of conflict.)
4. PSC's are not unique but have certain behavioural and structural characteristics in
common. They are predictable for this reason. PSC's universally are situations
which arise out of attempts to combat conditions of perceived victimization
stemming from: A- the denial of separate identity of parties involved in the
process; B- an absence of security of culture and valued relationships; and C- an
absence of effective political participation through which victimization can be
remedied.
5. Tracking conflict negotiations, temporary settlements and the outbreak of further
confl iets draws attention to the reality that human needs and longstanding cultural
values will not be traded, exchanged or bargained over. Agreements that came
out of negotiations that may give certain advantages to elites, but do not touch
upon the underlying issues in the conflict, do not last.
6. Conflict and cooperative events flow together even in the most severe of intense
conflicts. Cooperative events are not sufficient to abate PSC's. Tension
reduction measures may make the conflict more bearable in the short term, but
conflict resolution involves a far more complex process than mere conflict
management.
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7. The most useful unit of analysis in PSC's is the identity group: racial, religious,
ethnic, cultural, poor and others. The reason is that power finally rests with the
identity group, not the nation-state.
8. Internal and external relations between states and nations are included to satisfy
basic needs. Groups as actors in PSC's initiate plans, actions, reactions and
strategies in order to accomplish the goal of satisfying societal needs or of
reducing and eliminating need deficiencies. For these purposes the domestic and
the international are only arenas. In whatever arena the actors behave, they do so
to satisfy their needs. The motivations for actions are internal, not systemic or
international.
9. PSC's in multi-ethnic societies are not ameliorated peacefully by centralized
structures. For conflicts to be enduringly resolved, appropriate decentralized
structures are needed. These structures are designed to serve the psychological,
economic and relational needs of groups and individuals within nation-states.
Highly centralized political structures are sources of conflict. They reduce the
opportunity of a sense of community among groups, increase alienation and they
tend to deny to groups the means to accomplish their needs.
10. Researchers have failed to perceive the continuity over time of what appear to be
discrete conflicts. There is a strong tendency in international relations theory to
regard conflict actions as discrete, delineated by time and space, and
differentiated in terms of the actors, targets and issues involved. Conflict is
perceived as a phenomenon found in the natural unity of action, events which can
be empirically isolated, formalized and studied. Each situation is seen as a unique
one. No patterns or common features are related to common causes. It is
important to emphasize that the set of events, taken as contlictual, are always
preceded and followed by a stream of events. Because conflicts fluctuate in
intensity over time, researchers tend to make assertions about starting and end
points which may be of limited utility for the understanding of inertia embedded
in some conflict situations. (Azar & Burton, 1986:28-39)
Agnew (Kriesberg, Northrup, & Thorson, 1989:45) adds some important insights into
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PSC's with the introduction of spatial and temporal sources of intractability. These two
factors make conflicts more intractable, thereby viewing intractability as a process, rather
than a zero-sum condition of conflicts. Spatial sources are those that reflect the territory,
theatre or actual places of many (ethnic) conflicts, for instance competing territorial
claims, ritualisation of symbolic places, competition for control over spatial-economic
policy, etc. As conflicts occur, competing claims to territory and allocational authority
are seen increasingly in mutually exclusive terms. Conflicts as a consequence often
become more intractable. Temporal sources are those that reflect the cumulative-
temporal nature of (ethnic) conflict, for example the material stakes produced by conflict,
the new symbolic issues, the new naturalized "in-group war talk" and the conversion of
competing interests through 'sacrifice' to competing principles. The longer (ethnic)
conflicts last, the more intractable they often become.
Azar and Agnew add to our understanding by introducing some novel and unique ways of
viewing conflicts. Firstly the temporal aspect allows us to track conflict over time.
Conflicts are only perceived as such and studied if they are overt and violent. Covert,
latent or non-violent conflicts are not perceived as conflicts. The researcher then falls
into the trap of viewing each manifestation of conflict as unique. The conflict in the
Middle-East has shown four distinct phases: the colon ial phase, 1917-48; the period of
interstate conflict with the four Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-73; the transnational conflict
phase, 1973-89 (Heraclides, 89: 197); and the intranational phase, fighting the PLO,
Hamas and other organizations within Israeli occupied territory, 1989- present. By
identifying patterns and infrastructure within social reality related to these four phases,
information could be gleaned on the nature of deep structures and unobservable
mechanisms. The second important aspect to emerge from PSC's is that the re-
emergence of conflict suggests deep-rooted sources in the lives and therefore in the
identity formation processes of those collectives concerned increasingly forming the basis
of interest formulation. State sponsored denial of access to this process result in violence
directed against that entity or those it purports to represent.
The third aspect to emerge is that by tracking conflict and the processes of resolution,
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attention is drawn to the fact that human needs and longstanding values will not be
bargained over. Agreements struck by political elites that do not take this fact into
account, will not last. By placing agreements struck by political elites in a larger,
historical, macro-level context, their exploitative nature can be unveiled for it is possible
to see who's interests they represent.
The fourth aspect is Azar's identification of the 'identity group' as unit of analysis in
problem solving theory. The identity group could be equated to collectives and
civilizations in that it has no fixed connotations to start off with and it can evolve over
time. Identity groups for Azar can be based on racial, religious, ethnic and other common
factors. This notion can be extended by adding political, material, technological and
class dimensions as possible variants. Keeping in mind that individuals can belong to
more than one 'fit' among civilizations, this could account for often contradictory
behaviour within individuals and collectives.
This fact leads us to the fifth aspect. Azar's proposition that the drive to satisfy basic
needs is the main motivation for action between states, nations and identity groups in the
internal and external arenas, is limited. 'Satisfying individual societal needs' and
'eliminating need deficiencies' are two pursuits, governed by utility, that are a primal
drive in any collective. Utility is not the sole factor to compel collectivities to act, but
supplemented by intersubjective meanings of norms, of eternal reason, of institutions and
of social practices. Motivation for action cannot be limited to material forces alone but
by a configuration of forces that includes the existence of norms, rules, eternal reason,
institutions and practices.
The sixth aspect is that PSC's in multi-ethnic societies are not ameliorated peacefully by
centralized structures. Azar calls for decentralized structures to increase a sense of
community and provide collectives with a means to accomplish their needs. Movement
from centralized to decentralized forms of government is merely a reform of the current
system. There is conflicting evidence at best, to suggest that decentralized forms of
government will resolve deep-rooted cleavages between civilizations as illustrated by
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instances where partition or secession has been the only viable option. It is thus in Azar's
vision for the future where this thesis will differ more radically.
2.4: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Structure is the arena within which process takes place or actors act. In this arena the
likelihood for conflict or cooperation to emerge can be viewed on a continuum and is
equally possible. Competition, self-help and the security dilemma are not natural
phenomena within an anarchic world order but just as likely as cooperation and peace.
This basic premise allows us to formulate the central research proposition: "Political
elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict." The validation of this
proposition as set out by the research objectives, and taking into account Azar's 10
propositions on protracted social conflicts, should point us in the direction that conflict
has become a source, rather than an outcome of policy. This would establish the four
processes of conflict resolution (mediation, arbitration, negotiation and facilitation) as
inadequate for attaining lasting peace in situations of protracted social conflict. If
conflict is the source of policy formulation, de-escalation as a purely political elite
implemented process, would be extremely difficult to achieve in PSC's. A necessary
ingredient would be grass roots conciliation, the fifth process in conflict resolution.
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CHAPTER3
RESULTS PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION
Before we can begin the research on the critical indicators, it would be prudent to provide
some background on attempts at conflict resolution and events over the last decade in
Israel.
3.1: BACKGROUND-: IDGHLIGHTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE
PROCESS
Following World War II, the British government withdrew their mandate over Palestine
and the UN partitioned the area into Arab and Jewish states, an arrangement rejected by
the Arabs. Since the declaration of independence on May 14th, 1948, Israel had been
involved in five wars and had been the target of countless acts of terrorism and violence.
Israel defeated the Arabs in a series of wars without ending the deep tensions between the
opposing sides. The territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war are still under
disputation, being the Golan Heights (Syria), the West Bank and Gaza Strip (palestinian).
On April 25th, 1982, Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in pursuit of the 1979
Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Outstanding territorial disputes were resolved with Jordan in
the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace treaty. The First Intifada or uprising broke out in December
1987 signalling a new era of internal warfare. It was named Intifada, for it was an
uprising within the Palestinian community directed from the territories inside Israeli
borders without foreign help or intervention. It has been attributed to many factors of
which the most salient are the stalemate characterizing the mid-1980's combined with
relentless expansion of Israeli settlements linked with the expropriation of land.
(Moodley-Moore, 1998:46) This Intifada was characterized by terrorist attacks, suicide
bombings and mass protests mainly confined to the Gaza Strip and West bank areas but
occasionally spilling over into Israel itself. Israel was ill prepared for this kind of war as
previous wars were fought mainly across borders with neighbouring states. The main
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achievement was bringing to the fore the plight of the Palestinians, especially within the
mass media and the United Nations. As Moodley-Moore (1998:460) points out, the
Intifada did not defeat Israel militarily or cripple its economy, but it spurred Israeli
leaders onto new directions. An unexpected window of opportunity with the advent of
the Gulf War spurred the USA to nudge Israeli and Palestinian leaders closer to the
negotiation table. This event resulted in the Madrid International Conference.
THE MADRID FRAMEWORK (1991)
The Madrid International Conference was designed to serve as an opening forum for
future regional peace dialogue, having no power to impose solutions or veto agreements.
Yet the protagonists to the Middle East conflict, Israel and the Arab states, were all
disinclined (be it for different reasons) to take part in it and agreed only at the insistence
of the George Bush Sr. administration (Hermann & Newman, 2000:112). The
Palestinian delegation was not yet formally recognised as a legitimate, independent
negotiation partner by Israel and hence forced to take its place at the conference table as
part of the Jordanian delegation. The Madrid conference resulted in the commencement
of two separate yet parallel negotiation tracks- the bilateral and the multilateral tracks.
The bilateral negotiations were meant to resolve the conflicts of the past. The
multilateral negotiations in contrast, were intended to construct a Middle East for the
future, whilst building confidence amongst parties.
THE OSLO A AGREEMENT (1993)
The Oslo A Agreement was a major groundbreaking agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians. The Agreement was drawn up in a round of secret talks between Israeli and
Palestinian diplomats and academics in Norway during 1993. On September 9th, 1993,
Chairman Arafat sent a letter to Prime Minister Rabin in which he stated unequivocally
that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO):
• recognises the right of Israel to exist in peace and security;
• accepts UN Security Council Resolutions 242 & 338;
• commits itself to peaceful resolution of the conflict;
• renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence;
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• assumes responsibility over all PLO elements to ensure their compliance, prevent
violations, and discipline violators;
• affirms that those articles in the PLO Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist
are now inoperative and no longer valid;
• undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the
necessary changes to the Covenant.
In reply, Israel recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians in the peace
negotiations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001: 1).
On September 13th, 1993, a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP),
based on the agreement worked out in Oslo, was signed by the two parties in Washington
D.C., outlining the proposed interim self-government arrangements, as envisioned and
agreed upon by both sides. The arrangements contained in the DOP included immediate
Palestinian self rule in Gaza and Jericho, early empowerment for the Palestinians in the
West Bank, an agreement on self-government and an election of a Palestinian council.
Additionally, extensive economic cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians played
an important role in the DOP.
THE OSLO B INTERIM AGREEMENT (1995)
On September 28th, 1995, the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank
and Gaza Strip was signed in Washington D.C. While still perceived by both sides as
being no more than a transitional agreement on the path to fun autonomy and/or
statehood, this agreement was more far reaching than the Oslo A Agreement, both in
terms of the nature of autonomy and the amount of territory included.
The main object of the Interim Agreement was to broaden Palestinian self-government in
the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority- the Palestinian Council-
for an interim period not to exceed five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho
Agreement (i.e. no later than May 1999). Ttallowed the Palestinians to conduct their own
internal affairs, reduce points of friction between Israelis and Palestinians, and open a
new era of cooperation and co-existence based on common interest, dignity and mutual
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respect. At the same time, it protected Israel's vital interests, and in particular its security
interests both with regards to external security as well as the personal security of its
citizens in the West Bank (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001 :3).
This agreement effectively resulted in the transfer of over 90% of the Palestinian
population to Palestinian autonomy, but on an area covering less than 30% of the West
Bank. The agreement was implemented in a series of rapid Israeli withdrawals from the
Palestinian towns (Hermann & Newman, 2000:115). However, the town of Hebron had
not been evacuated by the time of the 1996 elections in which the Labour Party failed to
get re-elected. The new Netanyahu administration insisted on renegotiating the Hebron
redeployment but was honour bound to implement the agreements of the previous
government.
THE WYE RIVER AGREEMENT (1998)
Following ten days of intensive direct negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian
leaders, the Wye River Memorandum was signed at the White House, Washington D.C.
Hosted by Bill Clinton at the Wye plantation in Maryland, Israel's demands for
Palestinian action on security issues were aired. This was embodied in a specific
timetable of actions that was supposed to imprison wanted terrorists in Palestinian
Authority (PA) jails, reduce the amount of PA police from 40 000 to the Oslo authorised
30 000, act against Hamas infrastructure, collect unauthorised weapons, and take other
measures specified in a secret U.S. brokered security plan. The Israelis would also have a
public spectacle of a mass Palestinian gathering to renounce the Palestinian Charter's
anti-Israeli provisions (Hermann & Newman, 2000: 116).
Immediately after the signing of the agreement, it was clear that both parties interpreted
the implementation of the Wye River Agreement differently, and that it was unclear
whether the timetable would be adhered to.
THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH MEMORANDUM (1999)
On September 4th, 1999, the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum was signed by
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representatives ofIsrae1 and the PLO. Restating their commitment to full implementation
of all agreements reached since September 1993, the memorandum set out to resolve
outstanding issues of the interim status, in particular those set out in the Wye River
Memorandum of October 1998. The parties also restated their commitment to the Interim
Agreement's prohibition regarding initiating or taking any action that will change the
status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to the conclusion of the permanent status
agreement.
At the urging of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, U.S. president Bill Clinton
announced an invitation to Barak and PA Chairman Arafat to go to Camp David and
continue negotiations on the Middle East peace process. On July 12th, the Camp David
2000 Summit convened. It ended 13 days later without an agreement being reached. At
its conclusion, a trilateral statement was issued defining agreed principles for future
negotiations.
THE INTIFADA RESUMES (2000)
A highly controversial visit to the Temple Mount! Haram aI-Sharif by Likud leader Ariel
Sharon on September 28th, 2000, provoked the worst violence between Palestinians and
Israeli forces for years, signalling what was effectively the end of the peace process
between Israel and the Palestinians. Ironically, in an interview that same day, Ehud
Barak had for the first time publicly indicated his willingness to cede sovereignty of parts
of East Jerusalem, although not the Temple Mount, in order to establish a 'twin' Israel-
Palestine capital.
This culminated in the eventual ousting of the Labour Government led by Ehud Barak, to
be replaced by Ariel Sharon. In what was the largest margin of victory ever, Sharon took
up office on the March 7th, 2001. A policy statement was issued by the new Israeli
government stating that it is determined in its aspiration to achieve peace with its
Palestinian neighbour, but that the conduct of peace negotiations calls for tranquillity.
More than 600 people have died in related violence since, in what is commonly referred
to as the al-Aqsa intifada. (AI-Aqsa because it was commonly believed to have started at
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The six critical indicators are:
1. Manufacturing conditions of underdevelopment;
2. Un-integrated social and political systems, and distributive injustice;
3. Fostering cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism;
4. Placing issues under the 'sign of security';
5. The production of insecurity through the manipulation of identity formation
processes;
6. Monopolising the conflict resolution process.
the Temple Mount, the site of the AI-Aqsa mosque.)
3.2: CRITICAL INDICATORS
THEORY THAT INFORMS CRITICAL INDICATORS 1-2
Azar's (1986:28) first proposition on protracted social conflicts mentions enduring
features such as economic and technological underdevelopment, unintegrated social and
political systems and distributive injustice. Theory that informs us on these, essentially
utilitarian aspects of conflict, where human behaviour is orientated towards the
satisfaction of human needs, is put forward by Burton (1987:225) - the human needs
approach to conflict and its resolution; and GUIT (1970:319)- relative deprivation as
determinant of the magnitude of political violence.
The point of departure of the human needs approach is the inevitable tension between a
society that aims at integration and individuals who want to maintain their uniqueness. A
basic assumption is the concept of 'social contract', establishing the primacy of societal
interests as opposed to that of individuals and consequently, the obligation of the
authorities to impose the rules and norms of the whole on the deviants (peleg, 1999: 109).
Human beings possess individual needs that have to be satisfied. These needs are
uncontrollable and cannot be co-opted by governmental benefits or harnessed to societal
expectations. If they are not satisfied, tension will arise for people prefer to gratify their
30
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needs and forego societal norms.
Bay (Peleg, 1999:111) defines a human need as "any requirement for a person's survival,
health, or basic liberties; basic meaning that, to the extent that they are inadequately met,
mental or physical health is impaired. Thus 'need' refers to necessities for not only
biological survival but also for the health and development (physical and mental growth)
of persons as human beings." These needs always exist and are universal in that they
transcend culture.
Unfulfilled human needs is then a powerful independent variable to political behaviour.
Need satisfaction is viewed as a driver of social change. Tessendorf (1993: 19) points out
that proponents of needs theory agree unanimously on the social psychological
consequences which are associated with a failure to satisfy human needs. Behavioural
traits manifested in individual and group behaviour include the development of
frustration and alienation; the use of aggression as a defence mechanism against
perceived threats; rank disequilibrium; rising expectations; and perceptions of relative
deprivation.
GUIT went beyond human needs and focused on human values. He argued that the
primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent,
second the politicisation of that discontent and finally, its actualisation in violent action
against political objects and actors. Discontent arising from the perception of relative
deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participants in political violence
(1970:12). Relative deprivation is defined as "a perceived discrepancy between men's
value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and
conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities
are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining,
given the social means available to them. Societal conditions that increase the average
level or intensity of expectations without increasing the capabilities increase the intensity
of discontent" (1970: 13).
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Unfulfilled human needs and relative deprivation inform us 'why men rebel'. If
unfulfilled human needs and relative deprivation are the result of structural victimization
as imposed by political elites in a territory where there is violence, it corroborates this
thesis' central proposition. These indicators contend that the creation of absolute
deprivation as shown below through the examples of land, water, labour, closure and
settlements, leads to relative deprivation as experienced by the Palestinian society.
Relative deprivation is reflected in data that reflect how Palestinians and then Israelis
experience inequalities. This is elaborated upon below in the fifth indicator where
opinion polls were used to reflect attitude.
3.2.1 : FIRST INDICATOR: CONDITIONS FOR
UNDERDEVELOPMENT
The first indicator reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for
conflict through the creation of conditions of underdevelopment. In order to validate this
statement, it was necessary to find out more about the economic reality as experienced in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip (WBGS). Immediately apparent was the lack of accurate
data, with even the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau making use of 'estimates' for the
WBGS areas. The lack of any published budget and population figures for the occupied
territories in a period from 1967 up to 1991 is a result of Israeli Military rule and
testament to the complete lack of formal governance in the West bank and Gaza strip.
A- ISRAELI POLITICAL ELITES: POLICIES OF DEPRIVATION
Economic reality for Palestinian society was characterised by "de-development" (Roy,
1999:1). Twenty five years of Israeli military occupation resulted in the creation of a
Palestinian economy dependent on Israel. Salient features of the Palestinian economy as
found up to 1993 would be:
• a mainly inward production focus for domestic products with a heavy reliance on
agricultural goods;
• Israeli control of the factors of production within the WBGS such as land, water,
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labour and capital;
• external and internal border control as maintained by the Israeli Defence Force
(IDF) through multiple checkpoints (See Maps 2 & 3);
• dispossession of land for the construction of settlements and roads;
• legal and economic restrictions on production, water use, aid and labour rights;
• severe export restrictions (Roy, 1999:1).
LAND
Land dispossession for the use of Jewish settlements and the building of roads has been a
distinguishing feature of this period (maps 4 & 5). Depriving Palestinians of their land
meant less water wells, less agricultural land and less wilderness area for grazing of
livestock and recreational areas. The World Bank, in a draft of its September 1993 study,
"Developing the Occupied Territories- An Investment in Peace," notes:
"Confiscation of Palestinian land has enabled Israel to proceed with the construction of
settlements and related structures in various areas of the West Bank that were
traditionally considered to be wilderness zones. Most important among these are the
eastern slopes and the central part of the West Bank which once housed a variety of
wildlife and provided a winter grazing ground for livestock and recreation for the local
population .... Similarly, building agricultural settlements in the Jordan Valley has
gradually deprived the Palestinian inhabitants of these areas of their richest soils and
water wells. A similar situation has developed in the Gaza Strip where settlements have
encroached upon fertile inland and coastal areas. The Israeli settlement program was not
accompanied by adequate and proper environmental considerations. None of the
settlements have developed sewage treatment plants. Sewage is often allowed to run into
valleys even if a neighbouring [Palestinian] village is threatened. The sewage system of
the settlements on the eastern hills and slopes north of Jerusalem has contaminated fresh
water supplies for drinking and irrigation of Palestinian areas up to Jericho" (Foundation
for Middle East Peace, 1998:1).
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MAP 2: ISRAELI CHECK POINTS - WEST BANK
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Source: Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (2002)
MAP 3: ISRAELI CHECK POINTS - GAZA
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(Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction: Feb. 2002)
LABOUR
Labour was and still is controlled through the issuing of work permits or the 'right' to
enter Israeli territory and work therein. These permits are seldom issued for any lengthy
period of time with workers having to constantly reapply for permits. Every month, since
the start of the al-Aqsa intifada (29 September 2000), Israel has issued a limited number
of entry permits (a few thousand) for Palestinians employed within the Green Line
(Israel's 1967 borders), (B'Tselem, 2001 :1). In addition, a small number of workers, most
of them from the West Bank, succeed in entering Israel and getting to. their jobs without
having permits. These workers run the risk of being caught, detained and their employers
severely fined in regular round-ups by the Israeli Defence Force. Because of the closure,
the vast majority of Palestinians employed in Israel prior to the intifada lost their jobs.
WATER
Water is one of the scarcest resources in the Middle Eastern region and therefore a much
valued commodity. The chief surface water resource is the Jordan river and can be
divided into the Upper-Jordan drainage basin and the Lower-Jordan drainage basin.
(Isaac, 1992:4) The Upper-Jordan system is fed by water from southern Lebanon, the
southern and western slopes of Mount Hermon and the rest of the Golan Heights. Water
drains into.Lake Tiberias, also known as the Sea of Galilee. The Lower-Jordan section is
mainly fed by springs and runoff water from the West Bank, Syrian and Jordanian
regions. Only about 30% of water is surface water, the rest is ground water. Ground
water in the West Bank originates from the "West Bank aquifer system", discharging
through springs in the area. Israeli control of these water resources in the form of canals,
pumping systems and allocation of quotas have had severe effects on the mainly
agricultural economy of the Palestinian areas. West Bank groundwater accounts for 25%
of Israel's total supply. Israeli settlers in the West Bank use about four times more water
than their Palestinian neighbours and pay about a third as much per cubic meter (Postal,
WorldWatch Institute, 2001). The 'Coastal aquifer system' supplying the Gaza Strip has
been depleted beyond replenishable levels with severe salination setting in. The Israeli
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government's response to accusations that it is responsible for the salination of the Gaza
aquifer system points out that the large number of private wells in the Gaza area makes it
almost impossible to control the level of pumping from the two underground aquifers
which supply the region. Such excess pumping accounts for a 33 percent water deficit in
the aquifers, an improvement over 1967 when the deficit stood at approximately 50
percent. This reduction in the deficit was made possible through the introduction of
advanced irrigation techniques and other efficiency improvement measures. A reverse
osmosis desalination plant was set up in Dir-el-Balah, water networks were installed and
new water lines were laid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993) (Tables 1&2).
Table 1: Distribution of the Annual Water Amounts from The Basins in the West
Bank Between the Palestinians and the Israelis According to the Oslo Agreement.
3622 20
~~:;;::~==: ... .....:.::"'". . 1'-"7,.__ __;2=5 ..... __ ......:.;!~
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Source: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC)
(palestinian National Bureau of Statistics- www.pna.org, Oct. 2001)
Table 2: Water Purchased from Israeli Water Company (Mekorot) for Domestic
Use in the Palestinian Territory by Region and Month, 1998.*
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"Includes the pumped water from the wells which are located in the Palestinian Territory and controlled by Mekorot .
.. For domestic and agricultural use.
Source: Palestinian Water Authority
(Palestinian National Bureau of Statistics- www.pna.org, Oct. 2001)
1993 ONWARDS
Since the Oslo A Agreement (1993), noting the specific clauses and subsequent
agreements for economic cooperation, we find the introduction of new structures for
underdevelopment such as the policy of closures and accelerated land settlement. The
policy of closure consists of 'general' closure, 'total' closure, 'internal' closure,
'external' closure and curfews.
• General closure refers to the overall restrictions placed on the movement of
labour, goods and the factors of production between the West Bank and Gaza and
between these territories and Israel, and is usually accompanied by delays and
searches at border crossings (Roy, 2001 :6). Searches are carried out manually by
the Israeli Defence Force. There is also no 'sealed container system' in operation,
meaning that all goods have to be searched.
• Total closure is where the West Bank and Gaza Strip is sealed off completely,
usually in the wake of a severe terrorist attack or in anticipation of one.
Movement is not only confined to either the West Bank or Gaza Strip, but also
within these areas, having the effect of sealing towns into giant prisons.
• Internal closure is the restriction of movement to either the West Bank or the
Gaza strip, with multiple checkpoints in between different towns (maps 2 & 3).
This was facilitated by the Oslo B Agreement which effectively turned the West
Bank into a series of cantons separated from each other by areas of Israeli control
(Roy, 2001 :5). The report of the United Nations Human Rights Inquiry
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Commission states that during the 123-day period from 1 October 2000 to 31
January 2001, the Israeli-Palestinian border was closed for labour and trade flows
for 93 days. Internal movement restrictions and internal closures were in place
100% of the time in the West Bank and 89% of the time in Gaza (2001: 1).
• External closures include the closure of borders with the neighbouring countries
such as Egypt and Jordan. This means that the Gaza port and airfields are closed
as well. External closure also includes the restrictions on imports by the Israeli
Defence Force. The UN Human Rights Inquiry Commission (2001 :1) found that
the construction and building sector in the Palestinian territories has been
practically suspended due to products like cement, steel and timber being denied
entry through the control at border checkpoints.
• Curfews have been implemented in certain regions to restrict movement at night.
In sectors such as those close to Hebron, curfews are imposed on the Palestinian
population to allow Jewish settler movement at night.
The UN commissioned, Second Quarterly Report on Economic and Social Conditions
(April, 1997:1) states that the Israeli closure policy is estimated to have reduced the
number of normal working days in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by about 20% during
1993-1996 and 30% of such days during 1996. The resulting losses in income-generating
opportunities during 1993-1996 are estimated at US$ 4.4 million per day and over US$ 5
million in 1996.
SETTLEMENTS
As pointed out above, the Israeli policy of moving settlers into the West Bank and Gaza
Strip areas has been done at the direct expense of the Palestinians. The Mitchell Report,
issued 30th April 2001 by the Sharm el-Sheikh fact-fmding committee headed by U.S.
Senator George Mitchell, found that Palestinians are genuinely angry at the growth of
settlements and at their daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of
Israel's presence in their territories (Mitchell, 2001: 1). Settlement expansion has
markedly increased during the 1990's to a settler population of over 200 000 by
September 2000 (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2001 :1). The Mitchell Report also
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found that cessation of violence would be particularly hard to sustain unless settlement
construction was stopped and pointed out the usefulness of strategic settlements as
bargaining chips in future negotiations.
The Commission on Human Rights found that by October 2000, there were 190
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, inhabited by approximately 380,000 settlers, of
whom some 180,000 live in the East Jerusalem area.
Graph 1: Settler Population in the WBGS, 1972-1998
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(Foundation for Middle East Peace, Oct. 2001: www.fmep.org)
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Map 4: Settlements and Land Confiscatlon in the West Bank
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B) PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY: A DIFFICULT TRANSITION
FROM TERRORIST ORGANISATION TO GOVERNMENT
The Palestinian Authority, upon its official taking up of 'government' over the
Palestinian territories, appointed many of the "Tunisians" (the Palestine Liberation
Organisation was stationed in Tunisia during its years of exile), or PLO members that
served in Tunisia, to key positions, much to the chagrin of local Palestinians. This led to
what Baskin (2000:2) referred to as the ceasing of political 'party life', or the severe
curtailment of dialogue within the Palestinian political community, as illustrated by the
demise of a host of political parties. Ideology made way in the face of short term private
gains as illustrated by the political cronyism and heavy handed rule of the Palestinian
Authority in the economy. Roy (2001:6) argues that the adoption of economic policies
that was protectionist, corrupt through its lack of accountability and transparency, and the
fostering of monopolies in the commodity sector, frightened many potential investors.
"The Palestinian Authority's heavy-handed presence in the market, most keenly feIt
through state-dominated monopolies, personally controlled by individuals high in the
Palestinian Authority bureaucracy working in collaboration with Israeli suppliers, also
had a stifling effect on the economy" (Roy, 2001:6). Foreign investment is also tightly
controlled by Arafat and a handful of individuals, in alliance with specific private sector
interests and external actors including former Israeli military and security officials.
Many Israeli Palestinian leaders and intellectuals interviewed by Muhammad Amara
expressed similar disappointment with the PA: "Lutfi Mash'ur, editor of al-Sinara, a
leading Arab newspaper, said he wishes to see more democracy and believes that the
current PA governing style is such a catastrophe that the Israeli occupation is preferable
in some cases. He is very pessimistic as to the PA's factionalism, tribalism, and lack of
respect for democracy and freedom. Walid Sadik, a Knesset member, agrees with
Mash'ur and adds that 'everything is based on tribalism rather than achievements, and the
achievements of the Intifada are lost" (Amara, 2000:2).
Corruption and cronyism amongst political elites serve to perpetuate conditions of
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underdevelopment. US and Israeli tacit sanctioning of this lack of democracy has
compounded the problem.
3.2.2: SECOND INDICATOR: UNINTEGRATED SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE
The second indicator reads: "political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure
for conflict through the creation of unintegrated social and political systems and
distributive injustice". The West Bank and Gaza Strip areas are regarded as occupied
territories and consequently the status of Palestinians in these areas are that of a stateless
society, subject to interim agreement. They neither have the right to vote in Israel nor are
they allowed to enter without express Israeli permission. They do not carry Palestinian
passports and as pointed out above, their movements are severely restricted by the Israeli
Defence Force. Palestinians in neighbouring countries with the exception of Jordan
(mostly Lebanon and Syria), have only refugee status, primarily in anticipation of their
eventual return to Palestine. No citizen rights have been granted them which include the
right to vote and partake in political activity in the country of domicile.
Table 3: UNRWA Registered Refugees
U RWAReOI"T_I!D .'UOI!. (JUNI!2008)
~
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% of tatal pOpUlation 29.7 18 32.2 2.5 11.1 30.7
% of tolal RRs 16 22 42 10 10 100
No.of relUges camps 19 8 10H 10 12 59
RUliving rn camJ!i 151,616 451,186 280.191 111.712 210,115 1,211.480
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W~ou15rde camps 425,333 373,436 1,290.001 211.481 165,757 2,526.014
~BCIIIIIQ50:
Schools 96 168 192 110 14 640
Training Cl!ntO's. 3 1 2 1 1 BPrimary Health Care 34 18 23 23 25 122
UNRWA. !Source: UNRWA fn ngurfl5. UNImA Headquarters. June 2000.)
(United Nations Reliefand Works Agency: 2001)
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For Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas, the confiscation of land and the
destruction of property serve as a key point in their alienation from the Israelis. Since
1967, Israel has expropriated approximately 79% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,
including East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of
International Affairs (PASSIA) report states that during the period, January to November
1999, over 7140 fruit and olive trees were uprooted and 50 708 dunurns of land
confiscated. Furthermore, Israeli authorities have partially or wholly demolished over
6000 houses in the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas and 2500 houses in East Jerusalem.
Houses are demolished as a punitive measure or under the pretext of a lack of building
permits. Palestinians are also prohibited from building in 60% of the West Bank and
87% of East Jerusalem (PASSIA, 2001: 1). These figures are however contradicted by
alternative sources.
Repeated claims for compensation have thus far been summarily ignored by the Israeli
government, serving to deny Palestinians effective recompense for victimization suffered
at the hand of the Israeli "bulldozers" and to further the social distance between
Palestinians and Israelis.
Social integration is stifled as well. Scham (2000) conducted a study of 195 research
cooperation projects run jointly by Israeli scholars with Arab counterparts from the
Palestinian Authority and Jordan. He found that difficulties encountered in developing
such research cooperation stemmed from a resistance in the Arab world to
"normalisation" of relations with Israelis.
The notable absence of democracy within the Palestinian Authority points to a lack of
political integration. Chairman Arafat's declaration that he could not sign "Palestinian
Basic Law" is indicative of the fact that a separation of authority to impose checks and
balances between executive and legislative branches, would not only stifle PA control,
but could also be counterproductive when dealing with the Israelis. This is enhanced
through a lack of objections from the USA and Israel as main actors in the peace process.
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As Baskin points out: " ... various governments of Israel viewed Arafat's ability to take
actions against anti-peace forces in Palestine as overriding any need for Palestinian
democracy. This was summarized by Rabin's famous sentence - "bli bagatz u'bli
btzelem" - without the Supreme Court and without Bethlehem - meaning that Arafat
could arrest, detain, and even execute anyone, without any real due process of law"
(MIDDLE EAST REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 2000).
DISTRIBUTIVE INJUSTICE
Distributive injustice is illustrated by the 'creation of conditions of underdevelopment'
and 'unintegrated political and social structures' above. A total lack of any adequate
institutions to redistribute welfare benefits and mechanisms aimed at political integration
in the democratic sense, underlines conditions of distributive injustice. Perhaps
overshadowed by conditions within the occupied territories, is the plight of Israeli Arabs
(Palestinians living within Israeli borders) whose communities have also been racked by
violence. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights found in her report on her visit
to Israel and the occupied territories that Israeli Arabs are the subject of repeated
discrimination and neglect. Point 77 of her report states that: "most of the Arab Israelis
whom the High Commissioner met described their situation as one of exclusion,
prejudice, official hostility and routine humiliation" (2000:3).
Laws reinforce privilege and discriminated against the Palestinians by excluding them
from civic participation. Moodley-Moore (1998:39) points out three fundamental laws
that defined the Israeli state's preference for Jews over Arabs. These are the:
1. Law of Return, enacted in 1950, which grants all Jews the inalienable right to
immigrate to Israel and officially excludes the Palestinians in exile.
2. Law of Nationality of 1952 which gave all persons who are accorded 'Jewish
Nationality' under the Law of Return the right to claim Israeli nationality by
return without any formal procedures.
3. World Zionist Organisation! Jewish Agency (Status) Law of 1952 implicitly
imposed legal, economic, social and political discrimination against Arabs by
directing a wide range of functions to exclusively Zionist institutions.
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THEORY THAT INFORMS CRITICAL INDICATORS 3-5:
STRUCTURAL DISCOURSE
Material elements are important, but a protracted social conflict cannot be reduced to the
competing interests among pre-existing politically motivated entities alone. Azar's
(1986:28) second proposition therefore states that the real source of conflict is deep
rooted in the being of those concerned. A source ofPSC's is the denial of those elements
required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a
compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of
identity and effective participation in these processes.
Actors participating in this process of identity formation acquire identities by giving
meaning to objects and other actors. 'Actors' consist of individuals or aggregations of
individuals called collectivities or civilizations. It is collective meanings given to objects
and other actors that constitute structure. Structure mirrors the process of the formation
of collective identity. As Weides (1999: 17) argue: "Constructions of reality and the
codes of intelligibility out of which they are produced provide both conditions of
possibility and the limits on possibility; that is, they make it possible to act in the world
while simultaneously defining the 'horizon of the taken-for-granted' that marks the
boundaries of common sense and accepted knowledge."
Identity is inherently relational in that it constitutes conceptions of the self and others,
based on collective knowledge about expectations and intersubjective meanings. It
enables an actor to determine "who I ami we are" in a situation, in order to position itself
in a social role structure of shared understandings and expectations (Wendt, 1996:51).
This interdependence can be expressed as a binary relationship, the existence of the one
supposes the existence of the other. This notion could also be seen as an interdependence
between many actors, not just binary. Furthermore, identities can also differ within an
actor based on these different role-specific understandings: "The commitment to, and
salience of particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently social defmition of
the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold about themselves and
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one another, and which constitute the structure of the social world" (Wendt, 1992:397).
Cox's position on civilizations as realms of intersubjectively constituted identities that
cannot be seen as irrevocably territorially based is not entirely dissimilar to this position.
Identities are furthermore the basis of interest (Wendt, 1992:398). Actors' interest are
defined in relation to their specific identity roles in different situations. Interests also
change over time with identity as different situations emerge requiring different roles.
"An institution is a relatively stable set or "structure" of identities and interests. Such
structures are often codified in formal rules and norms but these have motivational force
only in virtue of actors' socialization to and participation in collective knowledge.
Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas
about how the world works" (Wendt, 1992:399). Structure is thus equated to institutions
in that it is constructed as collective knowledge but experienced as having an existence
over and above the individuals who happen to embody them at the moment. Structures or
then institutions, serve to constrain or coerce behaviour, imposing pressures and
constraints. (Cox, 1996:33) As such, identities and institutions do not exist apart from
each other but are as Giddens points out "mutually constitutive" (Wendt, 1992:399).
Institutions as constricting social entities influence the behaviour of societies, but because
socialization is a cognitive process, one cannot take for granted conflicts, threats and
security as natural processes in the formation of state identity. The state as institution is
not a natural phenomenon relating objectively to the external world. States are rather
collectivities of individuals that through their practices constitute the institution of the
state as an 'actor', and furthermore, as an 'actor' in the international arena define other
'actors' (states) in terms of their own interests, fears etc. It is this position that allows
Wendt to argue: "Because states do not have conceptions of self and other, and thus
security interests apart from or prior to interaction, we assume too much about the state of
nature if we concur with Waltz that, in virtue of anarchy, international political systems
like economic markets are formed by the co-action of self regarding units" (Wendt,
1992:401).
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It is here where constructivism as critical approach fundamentally differs from existing
neo-realist thinking. As Krause and Williams point out: "The basic claims of the critical
and constructivist approaches are that 'security' is not an objective condition, that threats
to it are not simply a matter of correctly perceiving a constellation of material forces, and
that the object of security is not stable or unchanging. Instead, questions about how the
object to be secured (nation, state or group) is constituted and how particular issues are
placed under a 'sign of security' become central. Security is understood as a particular
set of historical discourses and practices that rest upon institutionally shared
understandings" (1996:242).
These historical discourses and practices on security are manifested in three interrelated
processes. The first is the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images and political
symbolism in order to solidify cohesion and fortify identity. Threats are constructed to
denigrate the rival and legitimise action taken against the perceived threat. The second is
state sponsored placing of issues under the sign of security. These issues are then
subsumed within concepts and institutions of state security (military jargon and responses
against a particular target). The third process is the production of insecurity over those
whom the political elite governs. The processes of constructing a meaningful discourse
ofthreats, the fostering of cleavages, and placing issues under the sign of security, are not
politically neutral. These two processes have a direct influence on identity formation
processes within a civilization and serves as a source of insecurity.
3.2.3: TIDRD INDICATOR: FOSTERING CLEAVAGES, STEREO-
TYPICAL IMAGES AND POLITICAL SYMBOLISM
This proposition reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for
conflict through the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism.
As pointed out above, institutions such as the state serves to constrain or coerce
behaviour, imposing pressures and constraints. One such a mechanism at the disposal of
institutions is the monopolization of discourses and practices through the construction of
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threats. Campbell (WeIdes, 1992:152) argues that the construction ofa threat entails the
differentiation of a community from a threatening "other", thereby producing a boundary
between the community inside and the threat outside. The construction of threats serves
to solidify group cohesion and fortify identity. For the group to crystallise, foes are
required. Animosity and hostility is tacitly sanctioned if not encouraged. As Peleg
(1999: 118) points out: "Loyalty is contrived by dehumanising and demonising the rival
and consolidating an 'us-versus-them perspective'. Group identity is forged and
encouraged by denying rights and needs of the other by underscoring the exclusiveness
and pre-eminence of the self, the 'chosen people syndrome"'. In practice, this is
achieved through the fostering of cleavages and stereotypical images, and/or by
politicising or 'charging' ethnic, religious or strategic issues, events and territory with
symbolic content. Symbolic content is usually ascribed to collective and indivisible
goods like the Haram aI-Sharif! Temple Mount. Contentions over these areas lack
objective criteria for calm and negotiated compromise.
The state of Israel has had to absorb the influx of a large amount of Jews from all over
the world, Ashkenazi from the European countries, Sephardim (the Spaniards) from
mainly Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Ethiopia) and other Middle
Eastern countries (Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Lebanon etc.), even from countries as far
afield as Ethiopia and India. Most recently, Israel received a large influx of Russian
émigrés. This means that the Jewish nation is not homogeneous but extremely diverse,
requiring active nation building efforts from the Israeli government. Likewise, the
Palestinian people are deeply divided between refugees from different countries and
factions supporting different parties. Israeli efforts at nation building include the
mandatory study of Hebrew as official language and compulsory military service.
In order to find instances of the fostering of cleavages, the making of stereotypical
images and political symbolism, this study has tried to find references to separation of the
two civilizations in rhetoric used by key figures or leaders within society, official policy
documents and statements by official spokespersons.
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ISRAEL:
POLITICAL SYMBOLISM: The following is Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's address
to the Knesset delivered on May 29, 1995, on Jerusalem Day: "There was one moment in
the Six Day War which symbolized the great victory: that was the moment in which the
first paratroopers under Gur's command reached the stones of the Western Wall, feeling
the emotion of the place; there never was, and never will be, another moment like it.
Nobody staged that moment. Nobody planned it in advance. Nobody prepared it and
nobody was prepared for it; it was as if Providence had directed the whole thing: the
paratroopers weeping loudly and in pain over their comrades who had fallen along the
way, the words of the Kaddish prayer heard by Western Wall's stones after 19 years of
silence, tears of mourning, shouts of joy, and the singing of "Hatikvah"" (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2001).
The second example on the politicisation of symbolic places comes from Ariel Sharon's
inaugural speech to the Knesset (2001-03-07): "Jerusalem is the great dream, for which
the Jews yearned for and prayed for in every generation. If we turn our back to it - to its
symbols and our sacred places - we will put a question mark on our very future and
destiny. The late Yigal A lion, the commander of the Palmach and one of the most brilliant
commanders of the War of Independence, said: ''Apeople that does not respect its past
has a barren present and its future is shrouded in uncertainty." Jerusalem was and will
be the eternal capital of the Jewish people. Israeli Prime Ministers have always
reiterated this commitment in their inauguration speeches, including the late Yitzhak
Rabin. So, too, in the words of the vow: "IfI forget thee of Jerusalem, let my right hand
lose its cunning ... "" (Office of the Prime Minister, 2001).
In an address by Prime Minister of the time, Ehud Barak (November 8, 2000) on the fifth
anniversary of the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Barak made Israel's position on
Jerusalem clear: "I suspect that I don't have to explain Jerusalem's standing in the
Jewish and Israeli consciousness. The city's unification in 1967 and our return to the
holy places, under Jewish sovereignty after 2,000 years, were a kind of "big bang" that
reverberated on the deepest of Jewish heartstrings. The unity of Jerusalem, the eternal
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capital of the State of Israel, became the keystone of our national consensus. The Jewish
holy places in East Jerusalem are the pivot of Jewish history, identity, and faith. Jews
have been turning to the Temple Mount in prayer three times a day for thousands of
years. "(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
Inside the city of Jerusalem is the Temple Mount / Haram aI-Sharif. This is the most holy
site for Jews and the third most holy site for Arabs the world over. Ariel Sharon's visit to
it late in September 2000, is alleged to have sparked renewed violence and is
commemorated as the start of the current al-Aqsa intifada. This site has frequently been a
flashpoint for the eruption of violence and has had to be closed off on various occasions.
A contentious issue is excavation behind the wailing wall which is underneath the al-
Aqsa mosque. Palestinians believe that excavations underneath the site constitute a
desecration of the religious site.
In a statement issued by an Israeli Defence Force spokesperson, full responsibility for the
desecration of Joseph's tomb is charged at the Palestinian Authority: "The security of a
number of holy sites is mentioned in the Interim Agreements as being the responsibility of
the Palestinian Authority. The agreements ensure that the Palestinian Authority will be
responsible for the security of these sites, and that Jewish worshippers will be allowed
unhindered access to them. The Palestinians have not upheld this written agreement,
have not enabled Jewish worshippers to visit the sites and have allowed mobs to destroy
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and to burn the "Peace for Israel" synagogue in Jericho. In
violating the agreements, the Palestinians have proven that they cannot be trusted to
protect holy site" (IDF: 2001).
FOSTERING CLEAVAGES: One example is an address by Foreign Minister Levy (of
the Netanyahu government) to the Knesset on motions to the agenda on the Peace
Process: "There is yet another area of activity, of which we are aware, which poses a
serious danger. The Palestinian Authority is now co-opting to its discussions,
organizations which only yesterday it itself pointed to as a dangerous opposition seeking
to undermine the peace process. They are now partners in the talks. There is today also
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encouragement to begin to foment unrest - not yet violence, against which we admonish,
but unrest which is liable to deteriorate into violence, to which HAMAS is a party. Yes,
HAMAS is involved in this too. And if it is given a green light, it will destroy this process
with its own hands." (1997-03-12)
Many high ranking Israeli officials blame Chairman Arafat or the Palestinian Authority
personally for the perpetuation of violence, which serves to demonise the other side. The
first example is from a press conference with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on his
Return from the Wye Plantation Summit at Ben-Gurion Airport, Israel on
October 25, 1998: "Gone are the days when Israel gave and gave with no return except
for words and promises, or more precisely, false promises. They received territory and
we got terror. The terrorist monster of HAMAS grew as the territory under Palestinian
control increased, because the Palestinian Authority did not fulfill its obligations to
combat the terrorist infrastructure, and other obligations. " (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2001)
In a briefing given by Foreign Ministry Director-General Aion Liel to the Foreign Press
on February 14,2001, in the wake of the terrorist attack in Jerusalem, Liel responded to
a question on whether he sees Arafat personally responsible for the violence as follows:
"I see him responsible for the fact that the incitement is going on, all the time, and that
the intifada is going on. Arafat had hundreds of opportunities - in public appearance, he
is interviewed on television all the time - to call on his people to stop this violence, and
he didn't do it. We know, and we wrote in the report to the Mitchell Committee, that the
Palestinian Authority was behind this wave of violence, thought it could benefit from this
wave of violence, thought it could prove its bargaining position through the violence. So
we see him responsible for the violence, and we see him responsible for what he calls the
'al-Aqsa intifada '" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
STEREOTYPICAL IMAGES: Israeli's in general view the Palestinians as
untrustworthy, violent and dishonest. This is reflected in a joint project of the
Palestinian-Israeli People to People Program, conducted by the Jerusalem Media and
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Communication Centre (JMCC) and the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace Research (Tel
Aviv University) [See Indicator 3.2.5 below]. Popular rhetoric used at governmental
level when referring to the Palestinian Authority's unwillingness or inability to
implement decisions reached in negotiation, enforces these attitudes towards Palestinians.
The Israeli government blames the Palestinian Authority and Chairman Arafat personally
for the current al-Aqsa intifada as shown in an official policy statement by the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs: "The violent events recently witnessed in our region are the result of
a clear Palestinian decision to pursue violence as a political tool. Israel seeks to resolve
its differences with the Palestinians at the negotiating table, while Yasser Arafat and the
Palestinian Authority have chosen the path of ongoing confrontation" (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, 2001).
This was also clearly echoed in a statement by Prime Minister of the time Ehud Barak on
the November zo", 2000, in response to the violence connected to the al-Aqsa intifada:
"Today we suffered a very grave attack, carried out by the Fatah Tanzim. The
Palestinian Authority is, in our view, directly responsible for this attack. We have
therefore once again today taken forceful action against targets of the Palestinian
Authority in the Gaza Strip... We attacked targets of the Fatah, Tanzim and Force 17 -
offices, buildings, training camps. We also attacked a naval vantage point and a
television relay station from which incitement is broadcast to the Gaza Strip ...
The Palestinian Authority is systematically violating all agreements and understandings
which it signed. Thus, by its own doing, is it accountable for our victims... We will
continue to take vigorous action to bring about an end to the violence. We will act with
all force necessary, without restraint. The Palestinian Authority must understand that it
will achieve nothing through violence ... "(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY:
FOSTERING CLEA VAGES: Ruhi Fatuh, Secretary General of the Palestinian
Legislative Council and member of the Revolutionary Council of Fatah, Yasser Arafat's
mainstream faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization said the return to armed
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struggle should take place if a Palestinian state is not established by May 5th, 1999, when
the Israel-PLO accords expire: "The failed attempt to achieve peace made us realize that
the only way to solve the Palestinian problem in a just and comprehensive manner is to
implement the PLO's covenant.: meaning a return to the armed struggle, which is the
only language the Israelis understand ... " (Memri, 2001).
STEREOTYPICAL IMAGES: On October 13th, 2000, the official Palestinian
Authority television station broadcast live a Friday sermon in the Zayed bin Sultan Aal
Nahyan mosque in Gaza. Below are excerpts from the sermon, as transcribed by the
Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). The speaker is Dr. Ahmad Abu
Halabiya, Member of the Palestinian Authority-appointed "Fatwa Council" and former
acting Rector ofthe Islamic University in Gaza: "0 brother believers, the criminals, the
terrorists - are the Jews, who have butchered our children, orphaned them, widowed our
women and desecrated our holy places and sacred sites. They are the terrorists. They are
the ones who must be butchered and killed, as Allah the Almighty said: 'Fight them: Allah
will torture them at your hands, and will humiliate them and will help you to overcome
them, and will relieve the minds of the believers ... " (Memri, 2001). The Joint Project of
the Palestinian- Israeli People to People Program found that 87,5% of Palestinians
thought of Israelis as violent and 70,9% thought of Israelis as dishonest.
POLITICAL SYMBOLISM: The following are excerpts from an address given by
Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat at the headquarters of the Palestinian
Workers' Association in Gaza City, October 27th, 2001: " ...The tanks, planes, and
missiles will never subjugate our people, because it is at the forefront [of the battle], until
Judgment Day Oh mountain, the wind cannot move you; thus it is with our people, no
one can move it We are now at a crossroads, but I say that the Palestinian caravan is
on its way to the first direction of prayer [i.e. Jerusalem], to the third holiest place
[Jerusalem], to the place from which the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven
[Jerusalem, according to Koranic tradition], and the cradle of Jesus' birth [sic]. To
noble Jerusalem, the capital of the State of Palestine, whether anyone agrees or not [i.e.
Israel]. .. " (Memri: 2001).
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The Palestinian National Authority's Ministry of Information views Jerusalem as
fol1ows: "Israel's concepts, policies, and practices in Jerusalem can be summarized in
one sentence:- The Judaization of the Holy City, its land, its population, its history, and
its culture. This Judaization began with the emergence of the State of Israel in 1948,
intensified in the wake of the 1967 war and has continued ever since. "(Jerusalem Crying
out for Justice) "Among its arbitrary measures, Israel sent its archaeological teams to
excavate around and be/ow AI-Aqsa Mosque which has caused great damage to the
historic buildings. The Israeli government has desecrated the Islamic holy places,
attacked Muslim worshippers several times, and set onfire AI-Aqsa Mosque on 21 August
1968. The burning of the Mosque and the Israeli attempt to blow it up in 1980 were not
the last in its disgraceful acts, but it has also desecrated the holy tombs inside the Church
of the Holy Sepulchre and looted many churches" ('Jerusalem, Capital of Palestine')
[Ministry of Information, Palestine. 2001].
3.2.4: FOURTH INDICATOR: PLACING ISSUES UNDER THE
'SIGN OF SECURITY', SECURITY DISCOURSES
This proposition would read: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure
for conflict by placing issues under the 'sign of security'. By placing issues under the
'sign of security' it is meant that peacetime issues that fall under government
responsibility such as agriculture, environmental affairs, media and communication,
water affairs, labour etc. take on a military or security significance. These issues are
subsumed within the concepts and institutions of state security and elicit military
responses to military targets. It also provides justification for what might otherwise be
construed as questionable behaviour such as censure of the media and infringements of
human rights issues.
To understand this indicator better it is perhaps prudent to start with Israeli security
discourse. The importance of security to the Israeli government and indeed to its people,
is summarized by Ariel Sharon in his inaugural speech to the Knesset (2001-03-07):
"The supreme mission of the new Government is bolstering Israel's security, and
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acquiring personal security for the citizens of Israel while conducting the struggle
against violence and terror, and striving to achieve stability." Israel views violence as
'forced' upon it and not a preferred course of action. The image of Israel awash in a sea
of Arab countries is frequently invoked, as is apparent in a statement by then Prime
Minister Barak: "Whoever believes that 'peace is security', so that there is no needfor
special security arrangements in peacetime, has no idea of where he's living. The State of
Israel stands, with its back to the sea, facing on a region that is volatile, armed, and
awash with advanced weaponry - a region with a history of instability that is seething
with treacherous currents. Suffice it to mention the unforeseen revolution in Iran,
Saddam Hussein's sudden descent upon his sister state of Kuwait, the calls heard even at
the recent Arab summit for a 'holy war' against Israel, and the Palestinian Authority's
abrupt volte-face from negotiation and near-agreement to violent confrontation"
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nov 8, 2000).
Two distinct levels of security discourse can be identified: firstly, national security,
relating Israel to regional and global power structures; and secondly, domestic security,
relating Israel to the Palestinians. This is embodied in the Israeli Defence Force mission
statement:
TO DEFEND THE EXlSTENCE, TERRlTORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY
OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL. TO PROTECT THE INHABITANTS OF ISRAEL AND
TO COMBAT ALL FORMS OF TERRORISM WHICH THREATEN THE DAILY
LIFE (Israeli Defence Foree, 2001).
National security: Hermann & Newman state that the Israeli national security outlook is
based on the deep conviction that it operates under a permanent existential threat and that
this threat is not going to disappear in the foreseeable future, even if all peace treaties
with its neighbours are signed (2000:122). Israel's security doctrine is set out by the
Israeli Defence Force in six basic points:
• Israel cannot afford to lose a single war
• Defensive on the strategic level, no territorial ambitions.
• Desire to avoid war by political means and a credible deterrent posture.
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• Preventing escalation.
• Determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively.
• Combating terrorism. (IDF, 2001).
Israel's military capability is based on superior technology, nuclear deterrence and a
highly effective early warning capability based on (amongst other factors), a superior
intelligence network. Transferring the battle to the enemy's territory and a quick
conclusion of the war is viewed as imperative and served as the primary reasoning behind
a policy of 'Defensive Strategy- Offensive Tactics', as seen in Israel's first strike in the
Six Day War (1967). Despite the fact that Israel maintains superior military capabilities,
this did not enable it to effectively quell terrorist attacks inflicted upon it in the first
intifada during the late 1980' s and into the early 1990' s.
Domestic security: The Israeli military response to domestic violence was characterised
by a strategy of containment. Closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas was
devised to seal off the inflow of weapons into these areas, and limit the outflow of
violence. This was embodied in a policy of territorial separation where, as pointed out
above, work permits were issued to Palestinians for short periods at a time and revoked
whenever a certain level of closure was reached. A series of suicide and car bombings of
buses, public and military targets served only to intensify the Israeli Military operation.
A policy of expansion and consolidation of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip areas forms part of Israeli strategic security planning. Settlements encircle
Jerusalem to its eastern side, effectively cutting off Arab villages in the West Bank from
Arab neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem. This serves to create Arab 'ghettos' in East
Jerusalem, cut off territorially from the proposed Arab state.
Israeli security discourse has identified certain territories to be of strategic importance to
the long term security ofIsrael. This includes (previously) the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan
Heights, the Jordan valley along the Jordanian border and strategic hilltops in and around
the West Bank. Israeli national security doctrine has steadily moved in the direction of
exchanging territory for formal peace treaties (e.g., with Egypt and Jordan) or informal
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guarantees, including international monitoring, demilitarised zones, early warning
stations and bilateral security coordination (Rodman, 2001: 1).
Issues that conflict with or are deemed of importance to these strategic security objectives
on national and domestic level, are subsumed within the concepts and institutions of state
security, resulting in military responses to military targets. Environmental, agricultural
and economic issues serve as an example. Water is a scarce resource and deemed as of
strategic importance to Israel. The West Bank aquifer system provides an abundance of
water to the Palestinian areas, however, Israeli control of water supplies through the
construction of canals, pumping systems and the rationing of water to the Palestinian
areas, have had a severe impact on its mainly agricultural economy. The Israeli company
Mekarot pumps water from wells situated in the Palestinian territories and then sells it to
the Palestinians at a higher price than to the Israelis in settlements. Water has taken on a
security significance for Israel and is therefore subsumed within security discourse.
Furthermore, Israeli military searches and its denial of certain products to enter the
Palestinian territories, such as cement, timber and other construction materials, have
placed trade under the security rubric. The exploitation of non-unionised cheap
Palestinian labour is rationalised as of strategic importance to the Israeli economy.
Environmental and health concerns over untreated sewage flowing from settlements into
Palestinian towns, are ignored for the same reasons.
Palestinian security discourse resembles that of a liberation movement and not a
government. For example, the Palestinian Charter states:
• Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a
strategy and not a tactic. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute
resolution and abiding determination to pursue the armed struggle and to march
forward towards the armed popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and
restore its right to a natural life, and to exercise its right of self-determination and
national sovereignty.
• Article 10: Fedaeyeen's (freedom fighters) action forms the nucleus of the
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popular Palestinian war of liberation. This requires its promotion, extension and
protection, and the mobilization of all the Arab and Palestinian masses and
scientific capacities of the Palestinians, their organization and involvement in the
armed Palestinian revolution to ensure the continuation of the revolution, its
advancement and victory.
• Article 22: Zionism is a political movement organically related to the world
imperialism and is hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the
world. It is a racist and fanatic movement in its formation, aggressive,
expansionist, and colonialist in its aims, fascist and nazi in its means. Israel is the
tool of the Zionist movement and is a human and geographic base for world
imperialism. It is a concentration and a way for imperialism to the heart of the
Arab homeland, to strike at the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and
progress (Ministry of Information, Palestine, 2001).
Although the charter has been amended, security doctrine has not evolved into that of a
state having to defend its territory and protect its sovereignty.
The Palestinian Authority does not have an army and therefore does not playa role in
regional power equations. However, its domestic security discourse centres around two
main issues: firstly, settler activity and Israeli control of Palestinian national resources;
and secondly, the limitation of internal opposition within the West Bank and Gaza Strip
areas. The Palestinian Authority also has two forces at its disposal. Firstly, the
Palestinian Police force, numbering around 40 000. This force was created as a result of
the Oslo B Agreement and play an active role in managing security affairs in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip areas. The second force is the TANZIM ("organisation" in
English). The Palestinian Authority financially supports day-to-day activities of the
TANZIM, and Chairman Arafat is personally involved in the selection of senior leaders
in the organization. The Israeli Defence Force states that the TANZIM is part of the
Fatah organisation working towards the expansion of its membership to be the largest and
leading Palestinian faction in the Palestinian Authority. It also operates as an armed
militia for enforcing order and serves as a personal instrument of Chairman Arafat
(Israeli Defence Force, 2001). As armed militia, it is often in confrontation with other
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Palestinian splinter groups and terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
The TANZIM has also been responsible for attacks on Israel and have been targeted by
former prime minister Barak: "Today we suffered a very grave attack, carried out by the
Fatah Tanzim. The Palestinian Authority is, in our view, directly responsible for this
attack. We have therefore once again today taken forceful action against targets of the
Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip ... "(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).
Democratic principles such as freedom of speech, dialogue and multiple parties have thus
been placed under the 'sign of security' by the Palestinian Authority (more specificaJIy,
Fatah) in order to consolidate its own power position and limit the influence of
opposition.
3.2.5: FIFTH INDICATOR: THE PRODUCTION OF INSECURITY
AND THE MANIPULATION OF IDENTITY FORMATION
PROCESSES
The next critical indicator is the production of insecurity over those whom the political
elite governs. This proposition reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a
structure for conflict through the production of insecurity. The processes of constructing
discourses of threats, the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images, political
symbolism, and placing issues under the sign of security are not politically neutral.
These processes have a direct influence on identity formation processes within a
civilization and serves as a source of insecurity. This does not preclude actual acts of
violence perpetrated by political elites or spoilers as a source of insecurity. To explain:
As pointed out above in the theory, identity is inherently a social definition of an actor or
individual, grounded in the views or perceptions which actors coJIectively hold about
themselves and one another. Distinctive identity, social recognition of that identity and
effective participation in the processes shaping that identity is a deep rooted need in all.
Frustration of these needs, or attempts at politicising and co-optation of these processes
by political elites causes tension within civilizations as human needs and critical theory
points out (Tessendorf, 1993:19). Behavioural traits manifested in individuals and
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groups whose needs have been deprived, include the development of frustration and
alienation; the use of aggression as a defence mechanism against perceived threats; rank
disequilibrium; rising expectations; and perceptions of relative deprivation. Therefore we
can argue that the by-product of political processes which are by definition not politically
neutral, is the production of insecurity. Insecurity is manifested in societal attitudes
toward the 'opposite' society, opposite state/authority, toward the peace process/peace in
general, toward the violence/intifada, toward their own society and toward their own
state/authority. This is reflected in various opinion polls and in voter patterns.
To measure these attitudes, this thesis has referred to:
• the Peace Index (Tel Aviv University and the Tami Steinmetz Centre for Peace
Research, May & October 2001) [TAU, 2001],
• the Joint Project of the Palestinian-Israeli People to People Program (TAU and
Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre -JMCC, December 2000)
[TAU/JMCC,2001],
• the JMCC Palestinian Opinion Polls (Palestinians only, September 2001) [JMCC,
2001].
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OPPOSITE SOCIETY:
While 49% of Israeli Jews regarded Palestinians as violent in June 2000 (before the start
of the al-Aqsa intifada), this figure went up to 69% by December 2000. The same trend
holds true for the Palestinians, while 75% of them regarded Israeli Jews as violent in June
2000, this went up to 94% by December 2000. 51,5% of Israeli Jews regarded
Palestinians as dishonest, whilst 81,8% Palestinians regarded Israeli Jews as dishonest (in
December 2000). Only 33% of Israeli Jews regarded Palestinians as strong while 59,1%
of Palestinians regarded Israeli Jews as strong (TAU/JMCC, 2000). When asked if
Palestinians in general are willing to negotiate with Israelis, only 11,9% said yes while
61,2% replied in the negative. Satisfaction levels of solidarity from Palestinians living
inside Israel showed that 59,6% of Palestinians where satisfied with Israeli Arabs'
solidarity while 37,9% were dissatisfied (JMCC, 2001).
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ATTITUDES TOWARD THE OPPOSITE STATE! AUTHORITY:
When asked who is more responsible for the recent deterioration in Palestinian and Israeli
relations (i.e. the al-Aqsa intifada), 61% oflsraeli Jews blamed the Palestinian side, while
75,9% Palestinians blamed the Israeli side (TAU!JMCC, 2000). In the JMCC Palestinian
Opinion Poll, 82,6% of Palestinians blamed the Israeli government for the failure of the
Camp David negotiations and 58,3% see Jerusalem as the main issue for the failure
(JMCC, 2001). The Oslo (Peace) Index of May 2001 indicated a prevalent negative
attitude vis-it-vis the Palestinian side with 70% of the Jewish public estimating that
Chairman Arafat personally lacks the desire, or the capability, to sign an agreement to
end the conflict with Israel, even if Israel agrees to all his demands and that he will make
additional demands to foil the agreement. Only 12% of the Jewish public believed that
the Palestinian side would honour an agreement while 80% thought they would not
(TAU,2001).
ATTITUDES TOWARD OWN STATE:
In response to a question on whether the Palestinian president is in control of the
Palestinian situation, 21,6% Palestinians thought Chairman Arafat to be in complete
control, 45,7% thought he was in control up to a degree while 29,1% believed he had less
or no control of the situation. When asked to evaluate the performance of the Palestinian
National Authority, 62% rated it from good to very good while 33,6% rated it from bad to
very bad. Interestingly, only 29,2% of Palestinians support Fatah, 20,7% support Hamas
and 22,7% don't trust anyone (JMCC, 2001). The Oslo (Peace) Index of May 2001
showed that 82% of Jewish respondents thought that the State of Israel's national security
and the personal security of its citizens was worse than it was before the Oslo Process
started (TAU, 2001).
ATTITUDES TOWARD OWN SOCIETY:
In response to the question, 'How satisfied are you with Arab solidarity with the
Intifada?, only 16,2% of Palestinians expressed their satisfaction compared to 83% who
were dissatisfied (59,5% were total1y dissatisfied) (JMCC, 2001). In response to the
question, 'If the present state of violence persist over time, which of the two societies,
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Israeli or Palestinian, will in your opinion hold out longer where its national strength is
concerned?', 62% of Israeli Jews felt that they will hold out longer and only 12% feel
that the Palestinian society has a greater inner strength and will therefore be better able to
hold out in a lengthy violent confrontation (TAU, 2001),
ATTITUDES TOWARD PEACE/ PEACE PROCESS:
Asked whether the Palestinians support or oppose the peace process in general, 46,9%
supported it while 49% opposed it. Only 29,7% still supported the Oslo agreement whilst
62,9% opposed the agreement (JMCC, 2001). This finding shows consistency with the
JMCC/TAU People to People Program for December 2000, where only 28,7%
Palestinians believed the Oslo Agreement would bring about peace while 67,6% did not
believe so (TAU/JMCC, 2000). Only 13,9% of Israeli Jews believe that the Oslo
Agreement will bring about peace between Israel and the Palestinians in the coming years
while 68,3% did not think so. The General Peace Index shows that only 20,9% of Israeli
Jews believe there will be peace between Israel and the Arabs (in general) in the future,
while 66,3% do not believe it is possible (TAU,2001).
ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENCE/ INTIFADA:
Asked whether the Israeli population (IL Jews and IL Arabs combined) support or oppose
continuing the policy of targeted killings in the territories by Israel's security forces, 77%
of Jewish respondents replied in the affirmative, against 15% who were opposed; (8% did
not know). 68% of the Jewish public support the Israeli Defence Force's entering
Palestinian towns, while only 27% oppose it (the remaining 5% have no opinion) (TAU,
2001). Of the Palestinians asked whether they support the resumption of military
operations against Israeli targets, 86,4% supported the resumption while 9,9% thought it
to be harmful to Palestinian interests (JMCe, 2001).
Hermann & Newman (2000:125) point out an additional source of insecurity, the acts of
'spoilers' in the peace process, such as settler militias and groups like Hamas and Islamic
Jihad and the PFLP. They argue that fundamentalist religious ideologies which negate all
forms of compromise over those elements which, to their own way of thinking are pure,
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cannot be invalidated. These groups act according to a "divine plan", enacting their
god's wishes as a sacred duty, and are essentially locked in a zero-sum battle where one's
gain is at the direct expense of the other. These types of groups have claimed
responsibility for numerous acts of violence including the assassination of Prime Minister
Rabin (Yigal Amir, settler, Nov, 95), car-bomb attacks on many targets, a suicide bomb
attack on No.5 Bus on DizengoffStreet, Tel Aviv, and countless more incidents.
Graph 2: IDF,2001.
Monthly Breakdown of Terror Attacks (ShOOti0Pl Bombings, Grenades, Assaults,
Stabbing, Hit and Ron) Doring "Ebb and :now" (Since 29.09.00): Updated 12.11.01
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3.2.6: SIXTH INDICATOR: MONOPOLIZATION OF THE
CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCESS
The final proposition reads: political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure
for conflict through the monopolization of the conflict resolution process. As pointed out
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above in the theory (Chapter 2.3.2), this thesis makes the distinction between the conflict
resolution processes of facilitation, negotiation, arbitration and mediation -being
processes mainly employed by political elites to manage conflict; and conciliation -seen
as a bottom-up process of continued dialogue and interaction on grass roots level between
collectivities. What is meant by the term 'monopolization of conflict resolution
processes', is that political elites conduct the processes of facilitation, mediation,
negotiation and arbitration as processes to manage the conflict, without employing active
mechanisms to foster conciliation between collectivities. This indicator then makes the
claim that political elites are unable to bring about lasting peace within a protracted social
conflict for they rely on processes that help to manage the conflict and 'normalise' the
situation alone, instead of fostering additional mechanisms aimed at conciliation between
the opposing collectivities. Peace treaties would then be based on economic and political
enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations, without being accompanied by
sincere exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust;
and without addressing the deep rooted causes of the conflict.
The Madrid Conference of 1991 resulted in the commencement of two separate yet
parallel negotiation tracks- the bilateral and the multilateral tracks. The bilateral tracks
were designed to resolve conflicts of the past between different countries while the
multilateral negotiations in contrast, were intended to construct a Middle East for the
future, whilst building confidence amongst parties. Peters points out that the multilaterals
(multilateral working parties on different issue areas) were designed to allow the parties
to raise issues without much publicity. Multilaterals could best be described as an
exercise in diplomacy by stealth. "Thus, little thought was given to means of including
civil society in the proceedings. The lack of public awareness ultimately ran contrary to
one of the aims of the multilateral track, namely the creation of a series of confidence-
building measures between the peoples of the region. Since knowledge of the
multilaterals' activities was limited to the diplomats and elites involved, no confidence-
building among the peoples ever took place." (Meria, 1991: 1).
As pointed out above in the background, the Oslo A Agreement between Israel and the
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
67
Palestinians was drawn up in a round of secret talks between Israeli and Palestinian
diplomats and academics in Norway during 1993. This agreement inc1uded the
Declaration of Principles (DOP) and was followed shortly afterwards by three further
agreements dealing with more practical matters such as the implementation of the
agreement:
1) The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations- this Protocol included, in addition to
the Preamble and Principles, rulings on the Importation and Import Taxes,
Labour, Monetary and Financial Policy, Direct Taxation, Indirect Taxation,
Agriculture, Industry, Energy, Tourism, and Insurance. Areas in which no
agreement was reached or new questions for which answers could not be
determined under the Protocols were negotiated by a permanent Joint Economic
Committee (JEC) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
2) The Gaza-Jericho First Agreement signed in Cairo on the May 4th, 1994- the key
point of the agreement was the assumption of authority over most civilian affairs
in Gaza and Jericho by a 24-member Palestinian Authority chaired by Arafat. Its
authority would cover 62 square kilometres in Jericho and some 350 square
kilometres of Gaza, except for Israeli settlements and Israeli Defence Force
installations. Ground covered include the scheduled Israeli Defence Force military
withdrawal, transfer of authority, structure and composition of the Palestinian
Authority, jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian Authority,
legislative powers of the Palestinian Authority, arrangements on public security
and order, the Palestinian directorate of police force, safe passages and Israel-
Palestinian cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
3) The Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (August,
24th, 1994)- this preliminary agreement set out the scope for the transfer from
Israeli military and Civil Authority to Palestinian control in the West Bank, the
areas of health, education, social affairs, taxation, tourism and Value Added Tax
(VAT) on local production,
The Oslo B agreement signed on September zs", 1995 was designed to broaden
Palestinian self-rule and covered the following areas:
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• THE COUNCIL -Transfer of Authority, Elections, Structure of the
Palestinian Council, Size of the Council, The Executive Authority of
the Council, Open Government, Judicial Review, Powers and
Responsibilities of the Council;
• REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS-
Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces, Land, Arrangements for
Security and Public Order, Security, the Palestinian police, Prevention
of Hostile Acts, Confidence Building Measures;
• LEGAL AFFAIRS- jurisdiction, Legislative Powers of the Council,
Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Rights, Liabilities and
Obligations, Settlement of Differences and Disputes;
• COOPERA TION- Relations between Israel and the Council (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, 2001).
None of these agreements between political elites, nor any of the other ones signed, made
any attempts at the exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow
and mistrust. Political elites conducted the processes of facilitation, mediation,
negotiation and arbitration as processes to manage the conflict, without employing active
mechanisms to foster conciliation between collectivities.
68
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS
This thesis set out six critical indicators to establish a link between structure for conflict
and the actions taken by political elites. The overall effects of political elite action in
every field identified by the critical indicators have been far reaching.
To begin with, there exists a link between the actions taken by both the Israeli
government and the Palestinian Authority and conditions of underdevelopment. A
multitude of figures are given by differing reports of the United Nations and non-
governmental organisations, stating various levels of 'de-development', unemployment
and growing impoverishment as a direct result of policies such as closure on the Israeli
side and the Palestinian Authority's heavy-handed presence in the market, seen in state-
dominated monopolies and questionable investments.
The internal closure has severely disrupted life within the territories. Workers are unable
to reach their places of work and produce from farms cannot reach markets. Shops and
commercial offices are for most of the time, unable to open. Numerous limitations have
been placed on passage between the north and the south of the Gaza Strip and movement
between Gaza City and the cities of Khan Yunis and Rafah was prevented almost
entirely. Movement within the West Bank has become nearly impossible. Hundreds of
IDF checkpoints have been erected throughout the West Bank and entry to and exit from
towns requires passing through them. As Roy (1999:2) points out: " ..by severely
restricting Palestinian access to Jerusalem, the closure divided the West Bank's northern
and southern regions, whose key road connections pass through Jerusalem. In recent
years, less than 4 percent of all Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza had
permission to enter Jerusalem. Since East Jerusalem had always been the commercial
heart of the West Bank, the closure devastated the city's Arab economy as well." The
main issue that has emerged from the policy of internal closure is the large scale
unemployment resulting in a loss of income to Palestinian families and a rise in child
labour. Many Palestinians call Israel's actions a 'state of siege'. Furthermore, external
closure of international borders with Jordan, Egypt and the Gaza port to the rest of the
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world, have restricted the flow of goods and resulted in the closing of factories dependent
on materials from outside Palestine for their production. This has also had severe effects
on the Palestinian agriculture, being unable to export its produce either abroad or into
Israel. The report of the Human Rights Enquiry Commission (9 October, 2000) found
that direct economic losses arising from movement restrictions were estimated at 50
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) for the four-month period of the second intifada
and 75 per cent of wage income earned by Palestinian workers in Israel. The UNCTAD
Report of 4 October 2001 has published the latest usable figures on the Palestinian
economy: "Direct losses in national income assumed an accelerating trend, estimated at
over $2 bi11ion in the six-month period from October 1999 to March 2000 alone,
according to different sources. In addition, indirect losses are estimated at least at $200
mi11ionfor the same period. With domestic output cut by almost half in the last quarter
of the year, per capita GNI is estimated to have declined by at least 20 per cent in 2000.
Unemployment grew sharply, with over a third of the labour force (some 300,000
Palestinians) reported jobless in 2001. More than 1 million Palestinians are now living
under the poverty line of $2.10 a day and the income of around 64% of Palestinian
households has fallen below $400 a month." (UNCTAD, 2001).
Settlements: James A. Baker III commented on May 22nd, 1991- "Every time I have gone
to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met
with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy.
It's the first thing that Arabs-Arab governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in
the territories-whose situation is really quite desperate=the first thing they raise when
we talk to them. I don't think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement
activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace." (Mitchell Report,
200 1). The continued Israeli policy of settlement expansion, whether due to 'natural
growth' or some other reason has been a prime stumbling block in all negotiations. It has
aggravated ordinary Palestinians on ground level who have lost their houses, had their
farmland confiscated or had their olive and other fruit trees demolished and has
contributed to a growing sense of insecurity and frustration.
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The Palestinian Authority contributed to the creation of conditions of underdevelopment
by adopting a system of economic management that was both protectionist and corrupt.
Large PA-sponsored monopolies frightened off potential investors and had a stifling
effect on the economy. Corruption arose due to a lack of accountability, transparency
and legal recourse should wrongdoing have occurred. The cumulative effect of these
structures for underdevelopment is manifold. Poverty, deprivation and desperation
served as a breeding ground for attitudes to ferment and opportunists to exploit and
politicise daily suffering.
The second indicator identified unitegrated social and political systems and distributive
injustice as actions taken by political elites to create and perpetuate a structure for
conflict. The extremely limited democratic practice within the Palestinian Authority has
exacerbated the growing problem of spoilers in the peace process. An unintegrated
political system has stifled dialogue and not given voice to the many factions within
Palestinian society. US and Israeli silence over the matter meant that the Palestine
Liberation Organisation could bargain over and implement systems that served its
purposes at the expense of the society as a whole, such as its failure to separate the Rule
of Law form Executive power. This did not serve to temper the resolve of many
marginalized groups to spoil the peace process, becoming ever more radicalised in the
process in order to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the disenfranchised.
Events in Israel (Nov. 2001) to strip a member of the Knesset of his parliamentary
immunity in order to stand trial for utterances that were deemed politically inflammatory
can only be construed as a step backwards towards even more unintegrated political
systems. Ha'aretz, an Israeli daily newspaper, reported that the Knesset's action was
taken against MK Azmi Bishara (Balad-National Democratic Alliance) so that he could
stand trial for 'incitement against Israel' having urged Arabs to 'take the path of
resistance' and support Palestinian struggle against Israel (Ha'aretz, 2001). Bishara also
faces a separate trial over having arranged Tor Israeli Arabs to visit Syria, an offence
under Israeli law as Damascus is still in a state of formal war with Jerusalem. In a
separate, but not unrelated action, the parliament passed a preliminaryversion of a bill
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that would in future bar from Knesset candidacy any person deemed to have made
statements supporting terrorism or Israel's enemies. Even Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
commented: "Removing Bishara's immunity is a great achievement, which will increase
our security. Democracy has to protect itself" (Jerusalem Post, 2001). This action can
only serve to incite Israeli Palestinian groups already operating outside the Israeli
political systems as Ori Nir commentates: "The more you portray the Knesset as a place
in which Arabs have no influence, or have no ability to stand as equals, you bolster those
who argue that there's no point in playing by the rules of Israeli democracy." (Ha'aretz,
2001).
The third indicator sought out utterances and policy documents to illustrate the fostering
of cleavages, stereotypical images and political symbolism. Rhetoric used by political
leaders in statements and speeches, and published official doctrine, covenants and
charters, have a prima facie validity in the eyes of both collectivities. All this serves to
compound historical discourses of security, setting the horizon for the taken for granted
that marks the boundaries of common sense and accepted knowledge as Wendt points out
(1999,17). Threats are constructed to denigrate the rival and legitimise action taken
against the perceived threat. This forms part of a political process to solidify 'societal'
cohesion and fortify 'societal' identity. The inevitable tension that arises from this
process is indicative of the main proposition, that political elites have helped create and
perpetuate a structure for conflict.
Furthermore, the politicisation of indivisible goods such as the Haram al-Sharif/ Temple
Mount or Jerusalem for that matter, makes negotiated compromise on these places or
issues extremely difficult. By adding symbolic value to venues shared for religious
reasons or even venues in close proximity to each other, objective criteria for
compromise are negated and locks parties into a winner takes all situation. In the JMCC
public opinion poll, 42,6% of Palestinian respondents viewed the best and final solution
on the Jerusalem issue as a unified (East and West) Jerusalem, capital of Palestine. Add
to this the 28,2% who viewed it as the capital of Muslims only, we are left with 70,8%
Palestinians who do not want to share the city. 82,6% viewed Jerusalem as important for
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religious reasons.
The fourth indicator proposed that political elites have helped create and perpetuate a
structure for conflict through the placing of issues under the sign of security. Peacetime
issues such as government functions (agriculture, infrastructure, water procurement etc.) ,
and peacetime values (democratic principles and human rights) are subsumed within the
concepts and institutions of state security at national and domestic level eliciting military
responses to military targets. It also provides justification for what might otherwise be
construed as questionable behaviour such as censure of the media and curtailment of
human rights issues. Both the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority have
placed a wide range of issues under the sign of security. Israel, being a functioning
democracy, has tended to provide legal justification for Israeli Defence Force actions by
making and changing laws to suit military actions and needs. Examples would include
detention without trial, testimony extraction, prison conditions and human rights
suspension. Other actions would include the creation of the Civil Administration over the
occupied territories which effectively resulted in military rule. Permission is given to the
Israeli Defence Force by the Civil Administration to demolish houses and farmland under
the rubric of illegal building permits etc. Justification for theses actions is derived from
the security discourse. Similarly, the Palestinian placing of issues under the sign of
security corresponds with Palestinian Authority security discourse. The democratic
deficit and heavy-handed rule in the Palestinian economy stem from a need to fortify the
Fatah power base and finance these questionable actions.
The fifth indicator is the production of insecurity and the manipulation of identity
formation processes. As pointed out above, the processes of constructing discourses of
threats, the fostering of cleavages, stereotypical images, political symbolism, and the
placing of issues under the sign of security are not politically neutral. These processes
have a direct influence on identity formation-processes within a civilization and serves as
a source of insecurity. Insecurity is manifested in societal attitudes toward the 'opposite'
society, opposite state/authority, toward the peace process/peace in general, toward the
violence/intifada, toward their own society and toward their own state/authority. This is
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reflected in various opinion polls and in voter patterns. The opinion polls consulted
reveal a deep mistrust between Israelis and Palestinians. This is manifested towards the
opposite society, the opposite authority/state and towards the peace process in general.
In the analysis of opinion polls toward the opposite society, mistrust was reflected in the
fact that each regards the other as violent and dishonest. Interestingly, the Palestinians do
not regard the Israelis as weak, possibly reflecting the disproportionate power structure of
the region. Feelings towards the opposite state/authority reveal that both sides hold each
other responsible for the breakdown of the peace process and resultant violence and that
the Jewish collectivity do not believe that the Palestinian Authority would honour any
future agreements. Attitudes toward the peace process reflect relative consistency over
long periods of time in all three the Peace indices (Syrian-, Oslo- and General Peace
Index). Belief in the Oslo Agreements' ability to bring about peace has decreased
steadily since January 2000 reaching an all time low in September 2001 with only 29,8
points. This trend was also reflected by the other two indices, the Syrian Index hitting
30,6% and the General Index dropping to 47,1%, the lowest figures ever recorded. It
must also be taken into account that this survey was conducted between 23-25
September, 2001, after the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in the U.S.A.
The final indicator on the monopolisation of the conflict resolution process found no
evidence of widespread public involvement in the processes of negotiation, facilitation,
arbitration and mediation, neither did it find any mechanisms put in place by political
elites to foster confidence building at civilizational level. Peace treaties were based on
economic and political enticements, coercion or purely strategic considerations, without
addressing the deep-rooted causes of the conflict. None of the agreements between
political elites, nor any of the other ones signed, made any attempts at the sincere
exploration of underlying emotional legacies of fear, hatred, sorrow and mistrust.
Unlike the South African case, there were no mechanisms put in place for the creation of
bodies such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Land Claims
Commission. Years of extensive mobilisation of both these collectivities in accepting the
conflict as a normative reality and opposition within both the Israeli right wing and the
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Palestinian opposition groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, were not conducive to
the creation of these conciliatory mechanisms. Yet successive governments in Israel, and
the Palestinian Authority, after legitimately taking up governance over the West Bank
and Gaza Strip areas, did nothing to initiate such institutions. Instead, the Israeli
government changed from Labour to the more conservative Likud, and the PA exhibited
a marked decrease in and severe curtailment of dialogue within the Palestinian political
community. This illustrates the inability of negotiators to convince political elites of the
necessity of conciliation as a grass roots mechanism for conflict resolution, and serves to
affirm the key research proposition that political elites have helped create and perpetuate
a structure for conflict. Economic promises, political independence and security
deferment to the Palestinian Authority did not translate into better living conditions, more
integrated social and political structures and recognition of identity for the Palestinian
civilization. The exclusion of civil society from any forms of reconciliation merely
contributed to the feeling of alienation and mistrust between the opposing collectivities.
Consequently, political elite action such as the gaining of 'cognitive legitimacy' and the
'mustering of support' for the peace process has fallen short. Yitzhak Rabin's 'price to
be paid for peace' was too high due to the inability of political elites to create a feeling
that each member of society has an active stake in a peaceful solution to the conflict.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
This thesis has set out to establish an interest and prima facie validity between the actions
of political elites and the existence of a structure for conflict. By focusing on the
conflicts, tensions and contradictions in Israel and the Occupied Territories, six elements
were identified that form part of a configuration of forces constraining actions. These six
elements acted as critical indicators in order to validate the central proposition. We are
now able to draw the conclusion that in a protracted social conflict, such as the Middle
East, political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict. Over a
protracted period of time, conflict has become the source, rather than the outcome of
policy.
What are the implications of this for the question asked in the problem statement? (Is it
desirable for political elites to manipulate societal attitudes in a conflict resolution
process?) Political elites engaged in a peace process are responsible for the promotion of
a political reorientation to ensure that the peace process gains cognitive legitimacy. This
mustering of support is made difficult by the fact that a peace process follows years of
extensive mobilisation of the civilization to accept continuous and intense conflict as
constituting the normative condition (Hermann & Newman, 2000: 108). If political elites
have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict and this conflict has then
become the source of policy making, their capacity to successfully negotiate a lasting
peace settlement is severely constrained. Given the narrow scope political elites utilise in
their definition of security and conflict resolution (security seen as the ability of states
and societies to maintain their individual identity and functional integrity; conflict
resolution seen as the processes of facilitation, mediation ,arbitration and negotiation
confined to political elites only), it is not desirable for them to manipulate societal
attitudes in a conflict resolution process as it stands now, for conflict resolution is aimed
at management and normalization of an untenable structure of conditions, perpetuated by
political elites.
Kelman's social psychological analysis that sees conflict as a phenomenon that occurs
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between societies and not exclusively between states, informs us that negotiations aimed
at achieving lasting peace have to go beyond the achievement of political agreements to
include processes that are conducive to structural and attitudinal change and eventually to
reconciliation between parties, thus transforming the relationship. In order for lasting
peace to be achieved, conflict resolution in a protracted social conflict has to go beyond
the management of the conflict, towards a genuine involvement of collectivities in its
resolution through the creation of mechanisms, including confidence building and
cooperation measures, that foster conciliation at grass roots level. This widening of the
scope of conflict resolution necessitates the inclusion of a multitude of actors functioning
at different levels. Similarly, Miall's 'new thinking' (plO above) posits security as a
broader concept involving physical and economic well being, civil and political liberties,
a sustainable environment and social justice. It also calls for an awareness of what is
being defended, thereby shifting conventional security discourse to a systemic level. By
pointing out that political elites have helped create and perpetuate a structure for conflict,
this thesis has hoped to refocus attitude towards what is being secured- collective society;
how it is to be secured- social justice and poverty alleviation; and how de-escalation in a
protracted social conflict can be achieved- introducing mechanisms fostering conciliation
at grass roots level between civilizations. Middle East peace making have focused on
economic and political enticements, coercion and strategic considerations without
addressing the deep rooted causes of the conflict or the emotional legacies left by more
than a generation's worth of violence. The achievement of lasting peace calls for a
widening of the scope of conflict resolution to include grass roots conciliation and a new
thinking over security.
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